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IN LIEU OF MORAL RIGHTS FOR IP-
WRONGED MUSIC VOCALISTS: 
PERSONHOOD THEORY, MORAL RIGHTS, 
AND THE WPPT REVISITED 
©TUNEEN E. CHISOLM† 
INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law in the United States is failing music 
performers,1 and most specifically, music vocalists.  The 
utilitarian/economic incentive-based copyright regime not only 
minimizes the creative contribution of music performers2 and 
subjects the exclusive rights to exploit their works to an ever-
widening range of fair use exceptions, but it also disregards the 
personhood interests of most actual creators entirely.3  That 
disregard of personhood interests affects music vocalists more 
than authors of other copyrightable works because “a voice is as 
distinctive and personal as a face.  The human voice is one of the  
 
 
 
 
 
† Assistant Professor, Campbell University School of Law; J.D., University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; Sc.B., Brown University.  With gratitude, I acknowledge 
my former research assistants: Deirdre A. Clarke, for her foundational research 
when this article was but a budding thought, and Nourma Bumgarner, for her 
comprehensive research and enthusiastic support during my early drafts.  I am ever 
appreciative of the invaluable insight and constructive critiques of interim drafts 
from my commenters at the 2017 Lutie Lytle Writing Workshop, the 2017 IPsC at 
Cardozo, and the 2017 UNH Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable. 
1 See David Dante Troutt, I Own Therefore I Am:  Copyright, Personality, and 
Soul Music in the Digital Commons, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
373, 391–95 (2010) (focusing on personality interests in providing a written tour of 
“the history of African-American musical authorship to show how, like canaries in a 
coalmine, the appropriative harms committed against them were facilitated by the 
structure of copyright law and repeated against other musical authors”). 
2 See Tuneen E. Chisolm, Whose Song Is That?  Searching For Equity and 
Inspiration For Music Vocalists Under the Copyright Act, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 274, 
277–78, 291–305 (2017) (discussing the disparate treatment of music vocalists under 
copyright law, as compared to music composers, regarding authorship, ownership, 
fixation requirements, and available protections). 
3 Troutt, supra note 1, at 377. 
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most palpable ways identity is manifested.  [And thus,] especially 
[as to . . . ] a singer of renown, [t]he singer manifests herself in 
the song.”4 
An undergirding problem exacerbating the lack of 
personhood rights is that the U.S. copyright regime aims to 
maximize distribution of and access to creative works for societal 
benefits, in exchange for economic rewards to copyright owners, 
which are assumed to be sufficient incentives for authors to 
create.5  But owners and authors are not necessarily identical.  
That nonidentity leads to inequitable results for music 
performers who, as a group, lose control of when, how, in what 
context, and by whom their recorded performances are used, 
because the sound recording copyright is the only available 
copyright protection for their performances, and typically their 
record labels own that copyright.6 
Both economic7 and noneconomic consequences flow from the 
inability to manage and control the presentation of their works to 
the public that consumes their works.  This Article focuses on the 
noneconomic consequences primarily for music vocalists, 
although non-composer musicians who suffer similar loss of 
control of their recordings and related consequences may also 
benefit from the arguments presented. 
As Professor David Dante Troutt so aptly stated: “we often 
know an interest by the harms to it,” and “the measure of what is 
gained by copyright ownership is what is not lost to coerced 
control, unauthorized adaption or infringement.”8  And so, let us 
begin with the harms to music vocalists. 
 
4 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing a new 
tort of misappropriation of voice under California law, applicable to commercial use 
of widely known and deliberately imitated distinctive voices). 
5 See Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 
1532–37 (1990) (challenging this dual purpose of copyright as “an unsuccessful 
attempt to impose socialist ideals upon a capitalistic framework,” and arguing that 
“if we really are interested in the artists’ actual needs, we should recognize the 
European concept of moral rights, which preserve the bond between the artist and 
her work”) (citations omitted). 
6 Chisolm, supra note 2, at 378, 291–305. 
7 See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Comp., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 
1976). A clear economic consequence to the allocation of sound recording copyright 
ownership and control is that music performers enjoy little to no passive income 
generation from the exploitation of their recorded performances. See Chisolm, supra 
note 2, at 315–20 (2017) (discussing sources of passive income for composers versus 
recording artists, and comparisons of the two). 
8 Troutt, supra note 1, at 391–92 (emphasis added). 
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Amid the 2016 presidential election campaigns, one news 
report raised a question about music use in campaigns that has 
been a recurring issue in every presidential election for the past 
two decades:  “do bands have any recourse to stop politicians 
[from using their music], aside from making public statements 
and hoping to shame them into pulling the songs from their 
campaigns?”9  The Rolling Stones, Sting, Adele, John Cougar 
Mellencamp, Tom Petty, Van Halen, Bon Jovi, ABBA, Survivor, 
Neil Young, Aerosmith’s Steven Tyler, Jackson Browne, Sam & 
Dave’s Sam Moore, Talking Heads’ David Byrne, and Somali-
Canadian rapper K’naan are all among the growing list of 
recording artists who have taken issue with politicians playing 
“their songs” for campaign purposes.10  The answer to the 
question, as the news article correctly suggested, is “both yes and 
no.”11  The “yes” or “no” may depend upon “how the songs are 
used”12 for a songwriter/composer who owns or controls the 
copyright in the underlying music composition of the song at 
issue.13  But for recording artists who are non-composer 
 
9 Travis M. Andrews, The Rolling Stones Demand Trump Stop Using its Music 
at Rallies, but Can the Band Actually Stop Him?, WASH. POST (May 5, 2016, 9:46 
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/05/05/the-rolling-
stones-demand-trump-stop-using-its-music-at-rallies-but-can-the-band-actually-
stop-him/?utm_term=.b26fdc78f53e. 
10 Id.; Eveline Chao, Stop Using My Songs: 35 Artists Who Fought Politicians 
Over Their Music, ROLLING STONE (July 8, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/ 
music/lists/stop-using-my-song-34-artists-who-fought-politicians-over-their-music-
20150708/knaan-vs-mitt-romney-20150629; see also David C. Johnston, The Singer 
Did Not Approve This Message: Analyzing the Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted 
Music in Political Advertisements in Jackson Browne v. John McCain, 27 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 688–89 (2010) (detailing various artists’ demands regarding 
public performances of songs by presidential candidates in each election between 
1996 and 2008). 
11 Andrews, supra note 9. 
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(succeeding on claim for infringement of composition copyright, where politician 
Charles DeVore’s revised lyrics to Don Henley’s for use in his campaign ads and fair 
use defense did not apply). Blanket licenses from a performing rights society may 
allow legal use over the objections of the composer, leaving the decision to stop or not 
to the politician. Andrews, supra note 9. In 2012, campaign representatives for then 
presidential candidate Mitt Romney claimed to have blanket licenses from ASCAP 
and BMI to play the song “Wavin’ Flag” at a rally, in response to objections from 
rapper K’naan. Chao, supra note 10. Reportedly, the rapper “was deluged with 
Twitter messages accusing him of selling out to a conservative politician. The 
musician threatened legal action against the Romney campaign, explaining, ‘I'm for 
immigrants. I'm for poor people, and they don't seem to be what he's endorsing.’ He 
also added that he would ‘happily grant the Obama campaign use of my song 
without prejudice.’ ” Id. Despite the valid licenses, Romney ceased use. Id.; see also 
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musicians or non-composer vocalists, the answer is simply no.  
That “no” applies not only with respect to use of recorded 
performances for political campaigns, but also to their use for 
soundtracks, advertising, sampling, and many other uses that 
may conflict with the recording artist’s personal values, beliefs, 
or artistic preferences.14 
Consider next a scenario in which an unproven female 
vocalist, barely the age of twenty and devoid of bargaining power, 
enters into a recording contract that requires assignment of all 
copyrights in her recorded performances to the record label.  The 
young woman’s career flounders at first, but just when the label 
is ready to drop her, she has a hit record, her contract is 
renewed, and her career takes off making her an international, 
chart-topping star.  Years later, her career is abruptly halted 
when she is bound to a chair, gagged, raped, and tortured at 
knife-point for two and a half hours by an unknown assailant 
who breaks into her hotel room during a concert tour.  An all-
male jury awards her $2.5 million on claims against the hotel, 
but she suffers from continuing trauma, depression, and suicidal 
ideation.  Then, despite public knowledge of her violent rape and 
continuing mental condition, her record label licenses two of her 
signature hit songs for use in a film riddled with sex, 
prostitution, suicide, and rape.  A federal district court holds 
that, because her recording contract transferred the copyrights in 
her sound recordings to the record label, there is no claim the 
vocalist can bring and nothing she can do to obtain relief from 
the licensed use of her recorded vocal performances in a film she 
finds objectionable and even emotionally devastating.  This 
scenario is not fiction; it all happened to singer Connie Francis.15 
In addition to political uses and soundtrack uses, there are 
numerous examples of commercial advertising uses and music 
sampling uses of vocalists’ performances without their 
contemporaneous permission.  So what are the harms? 
 
James C. McKinley Jr., G.O.P. Candidates Are Told, Don’t Use the Verses, It’s Not 
Your Song, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/ 
arts/music/romney-and-gingrich-pull-songs-after-complaints.html. 
14 Troutt, supra note 1, at 422–23. 
15 See Franconero v. Universal Music Corp., 02 Civ. 1963, 2003 WL 22990060, 
*1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003); CONNIE FRANCIS, WHO’S SORRY Now 107, 117, 253–
267 & 317–320; (1984); Max H. Segel, Jury Awards Connie Francis $2.5 Million in 
Westbury Rape, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/07/02/ 
archives/jury-awards-connie-francis-25-million-in-westbury-rape.html. 
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The harms can be characterized as objectionable associations 
and ideological conflicts arising from unbridled exploitation of 
feature vocal performances, which arguably are among the most 
personal works of authorship of all.  It would seem a basic, 
almost common-sense imperative that a person’s voice captured 
in a recording is necessarily an extension of individual 
personhood worthy of legal protection from uses and, more 
specifically, from harmful associations, not personally authorized 
by the vocalist.  After all, courts have applied tort law and unfair 
competition law to prohibit the mere imitation of distinctive 
voices in advertisements, based on theories of false endorsement 
and misappropriation of voice.16  Where, then, is the protection 
for the music vocalist against the unchecked use of their actual 
voice, as embodied in sound recordings, for: political campaigns 
by politicians whom the artist does not support17; soundtracks to 
films or sampling in other music with objectionable content; 
advertising campaigns for products and other causes that are 
contrary to the artist’s personal values and beliefs; and even 
unimagined objectionable uses such as music torture?18  
Protection against those uses generally fails because the making 
of the sound recording was authorized by the artist, with no 
retained right of control as to its subsequent use. 
Music vocalists would have some redress if U.S. copyright 
law specifically granted a moral right of integrity, which gives 
authors some ability to control the context in which their creative 
works are used, even after transfer of their economic interests in 
the work.19  But despite obligations to grant a moral right of 
 
16 See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir. 2008); Waits v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (false endorsement and 
misappropriation of voice); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that “when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known 
and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated 
what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California”). 
17 Unwanted associations with political campaigns and other causes may also 
cause economic harm if the artist’s fans perceive the artist to have “sold out” or 
otherwise condoned principles associated with the politician or cause, that are 
antithetical to principles espoused by the artists, or those held by the fan-base. 
18 See Anna J. Mitran, Note, Facing the Music:  Moral Intellectual Property 
Rights As A Solution To Artist Outrage About Music Torture, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 
505, 506–08 (2016) (citing various reports on the use of music torture as an 
interrogation technique for detainees). 
19 See, e.g., Tanja Makovec Petrik, Moral Rights of Composers: The Protection of 
Attribution and Integrity Available to Musicians in the European Union and The 
United States, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 359, 374–80 (2012) 
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integrity under international treaties, such as the World 
Intellectual Property Organization’s Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, which is specific to music vocalists and other 
performers, and under the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, which applies to other authors, the 
United States has steadfastly resisted an explicit grant of moral 
rights, leaving all but a select subset of visual artists to depend 
upon alternative legal theories for redress in domestic disputes.20 
Increasingly, the alternative legal theories have fallen short 
of standing in the gap for the unavailable moral rights, 
particularly as it concerns non-composer recording artists.  Case 
law has whittled them down, substantially.  For decades, various 
scholars have acknowledged the gap in protection and argued for 
a legislative grant of some set of express moral rights in the 
United States, but most of the scholarly literature pays little 
attention, if any, to music vocalists.21  This Article takes a 
 
(providing a comparative analysis of the case outcomes for right-of-integrity-based 
lawsuits in the United States, France, and Spain). 
20 Notably, even after finally becoming a signatory to the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works—which mandates that signatories 
provide a right of integrity and right of attribution for creators of specific artistic 
works, but excludes musical performances from the definition of such works—the 
United States opted to grant limited moral rights to only a subset of visual artists 
via the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012); Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990, title VI of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (1990); Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2(1) & art. 6bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853, 
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris on July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
21 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Most Moral of Rights: The Right to Be 
Recognized as the Author of One’s Work, 8 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 44, 72 
(2016); Petrik, supra note 19, at 359 (arguing for a “limited, but explicit, [] moral 
rights protection for musical composers”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution 
Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 
43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1027 (2002) (arguing for “adoption of non-waivable, 
explicit, and broadly defined right of attribution” for all authors of copyrightable 
works); Lacey, supra note 5, at 1537 (proposing moral rights for writers and visual 
artists); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right:  Is an American 
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 72–91 (1985) (discussing, prior to the United 
States’ accession to the Berne Convention, how the Copyright Act of 1976 could be 
amended to explicitly recognize “an American variation of the moral right doctrine”); 
cf. Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap”, 2007 UTAH 
L. REV. 659, 660, 700 (2007) (examining failure of the “patchwork” of alternative 
theories to moral rights, and proposing amendment of Lanham Act § 45 to define 
“origin” as used in § 43(a) to apply to authors of copyrighted works); Robert C. Bird 
& Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the United 
Kingdom:  Challenges and Opportuities under the U.K.’s New Performances 
Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 276–81 (2006) (considering how online music 
performance could influence amendment of VARA or enactment of separate 
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different approach and argues for amendments to copyright law 
which would serve the interests of music vocalists, short of an 
explicit grant of moral rights. 
The first proposed amendment would provide a licensable, 
but otherwise inalienable copyright in a music vocalist’s fixed 
performance as an “applied composition” that coexists with, but 
is separate from, the sound recording copyright; the second 
amendment would restrict the permissible derivative works from 
a sound recording to use of the integrated whole with music 
vocalist consent.22  Challenging the ingrained notion that the 
only two copyrights at issue for nondramatic music are those for 
music compositions and sound recordings, this author first 
proposed the amendments in a recent article focused on the 
economic inequities that plague music vocalists as a result of 
limited copyright protections and copyright control issues.23  That 
article noted that such amendments were “a necessary precursor 
to remedying the music vocalist’s lack of control over creative 
works that are essentially an extension of their person,” but 
reserved the argument regarding personhood theory and moral 
rights for another day.24  This Article takes up that argument. 
Professor Troutt urged that “the personality interest should 
be elevated from its prior lurking status and paired with the 
dominant economic interest.”25  The amendments proposed in 
this Article accomplish that aim. 
The Introduction of this Article has identified some of the 
noneconomic harms of concern.  Part I summarizes and compares 
copyright ownership, control, and existing protections for authors 
of music compositions and sound recordings under the Copyright 
Act.  It also summarizes pertinent music industry practices that 
impact third party use of recorded vocalist performances.  Part II 
provides a foundation for understanding the nature of legal 
protections for creative works and the philosophical 
underpinnings of copyright law and moral rights, comparing 
utilitarianism and natural rights theory to personhood theory.  It 
also provides a brief explanation of moral rights.  Part III looks 
 
legislation to extend moral rights to music composers and musicians); Patrick G. 
Zabatta, Note, Moral Rights and Musical Works:  Are Composers Getting Berned?, 43 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1101–02 (1992). 
22 Chisolm, supra note 2, at 281–82, 330–33. 
23 Id. passim. 
24 Id. at 333, 330 n.264. 
25 Troutt, supra note 1, at 434. 
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at the United States’ obligations to music vocalists under the 
WPPT and discusses how pertinent U.S. legislative actions 
driven by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works have worked to widen the gap in protections 
for music vocalists.  Part IV returns to discussion of the harms, to 
illustrate how claims sounding in contract, tort, and unfair 
competition (specifically trademark infringement, false 
designation of origin, and false endorsement) have become 
increasingly ineffective as paths to redress of harms to 
personhood-based rights, generally and, in particular, for music 
vocalists.  Finally, Part V details the proposed amendments and 
demonstrates how they would provide the necessary redress, in 
reasonable alignment with the utilitarian/economic incentive aim 
of U.S. copyright law and the intent of the WIPO’s Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty. 
I. U.S. MUSIC COPYRIGHT AND PERTINENT INDUSTRY 
PRACTICES 
A. Current U.S. Copyright for Nondramatic Music-Related 
Works 
U.S. copyright protections apply to “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” in eight 
categories, only two of which concern non-dramatic music-related 
works: “musical works, including any accompanying words” and 
sound recordings.26  Pursuant to § 106 of the Act, the copyright 
owner obtains a bundle of exclusive rights to do or to authorize 
others to do the following: reproduce the work, prepare derivative 
works, distribute the work to the public, perform and display the 
work publicly—these two being inapplicable to sound 
recordings—and, as to sound recordings only, perform the work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.27 
1. Music Compositions 
The term “musical works” is consistently construed to refer 
to the musical composition, consisting of music score and lyrics; it 
does not include performances.28  The owner of a copyright in a 
 
26 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (enumerating works of authorship). 
27 Id. § 106. 
28 Congress intentionally did not define the term “musical works,” but instead 
relied upon its “fairly settled meaning.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), as 
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musical composition—typically the composer(s) and/or publishing 
company as assignee—obtains all exclusive rights provided by 
§ 106, except the right to perform the work publicly by means of a 
digital audio transmission, which is included in the more general 
right to perform the work publicly.29 
The exclusive right to make and distribute phonorecords of 
music compositions is subject to a compulsory mechanical license 
upon compliance with statutory provisions set forth in § 115 of 
the Act.30  That compulsory license is what allows other recording 
artists to make “covers” of a song, after the composer authorizes 
release of a first recording to the public.31  The compulsory 
license also allows the cover artist to adapt the musical 
arrangement of the work “to the extent necessary to conform it to 
the style or manner of interpretation of the performance 
involved,” but prohibits “chang[ing] the basic melody or 
fundamental character of the work.”32  Some have suggested that 
this qualification of the compulsory licensing scheme is an 
express codification of the moral right of integrity, but the 
statutory limitation serves the interests of the copyright owner, 
not the artistic interests of the author.33 
2. Sound Recordings 
“Sound recordings” are defined as “works that result from 
the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, 
[excluding] the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material 
objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they 
are embodied.”34  The sound recording copyright is intentionally 
limited.  The owner of a sound recording copyright obtains the 
exclusive rights to copy, prepare derivative works, and distribute 
copies or phonorecords to the public, as well as the right to 
 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666-67. See also U.S. Copyright OFF., 
Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 101, § 802.1 (3d ed. 2017), 
https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [hereinafter Copyright 
Compendium] (“For purposes of copyright registration, musical works (which are 
also known as musical compositions) are original works of authorship, consisting of 
music and any accompanying words.”). 
29 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (limiting the right to publicly perform a work through 
digital audio transmission to sound recordings). 
30 Id. § 115. 
31 Id. § 115(a)(1). 
32 Id. § 115(a)(2). 
33 See Petrik, supra note 19, at 370. 
34 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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perform the work publicly by means of digital transmission.35  
Due to the absence of the more general right of public 
performance from the sound recording exclusive rights bundle, 
the owner of the sound recording copyright is unable to prevent 
terrestrial broadcasters, restaurants, bars, stadiums, and other 
public forums from playing the sound recording once the first 
record has been sold.36 
3. Vocal Performances 
Currently, a music vocalist’s performance is treated as 
merely a contribution to the sound recording; it is not currently 
recognized as a copyrightable work separate and apart from the 
sound recording.37  This is so, even though the vocalist’s 
performance otherwise meets the criteria for an original creative 
work and, in fact, provides the basis for the vocalist’s recognized 
authorship of the sound recording that captures the 
performance.38 
 
 
35 The digital performance right was first added to the copyright bundle for 
sound recordings under the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act in 
1995, and later expanded by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (the 
“DMCA”). Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
10439, § 2, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified at 17 U.S.C.§ 106(6) (2012)); Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 402, 405, 112 Stat. 2860, 
2888, 2890-2902 (1998). Due to the expanded digital performance right, all digital 
broadcasters—such as iHeart Radio, Pandora, Spotify, and other subscription and 
non-subscription interactive digital music providers—must pay royalties to the 
sound recording copyright holders. Non-interactive internet radio stations can 
qualify for a compulsory license under § 114 of the Act and pay a statutory fee. 
Interactive digital transmission providers must negotiate their royalty rate. For the 
terms of qualification for compulsory digital transmission licensing, see generally 
17 U.S.C. § 114. 
36 See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940). 
37 Copyright Compendium, supra note 28, at § 803.3A (“Examples of 
performance authorship include playing an instrument, singing, speaking, or 
creating other sounds that are captured and fixed in the sound recording. Individual 
performance authorship may be claimed only if the sound recording is comprised 
solely of an individual performance that is sufficiently creative. If a performance is 
part of an integrated work (e.g., a band performance), the Office will not accept a 
claim in an individual performer’s contribution to that work.”). 
38 For an in-depth discussion of why, once fixed, music vocalist performances 
should be treated as copyrightable works capable of subsisting on their own, but 
separate from the sound recording, see Chisolm, supra note 2, at 291–300. 
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B. Authorship, Ownership, and Copyright Control Issues 
While the music composition copyright vests in the 
composer(s) of the music score and any lyrics as author(s) under 
§ 201(a), authorship is not statutorily specified for sound 
recordings, and there is substantial ambiguity around whether a 
record label may claim author status under the work-for-hire 
doctrine.39  Certainly the recording artist is an author, by virtue 
of his or her copyrightable performance.  But, the legislative 
history leaves the door open to claims of authorship by whomever 
is “responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and 
electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing 
them to make the final . . . recording,” which extends authorship 
to sound engineers and producers, and, arguably, even record 
labels employing such persons.40 
This disparate treatment of music composer and music 
performer authorship under the Copyright Act leads to 
differences in copyright exploitation control. 
1. Controlling Music Composition Copyright Exploitation 
Composers generally control exploitation of music 
compositions via their chosen music publisher and licensing 
agents.41  The music publishing company may be wholly owned 
by the composer, in which case the composer effectively retains 
full control of the copyright and all royalties from its exploitation 
as a writer-publisher.  Or, the music publishing company may be 
an affiliate of a record label, in which case the composer may (a) 
co-own the copyright with the music publishing company or 
transfer the copyright completely, (b) share or cede control of 
administration, and (c) share royalties from exploitation of the 
copyright.42 
 
39 See id. at 288–90. The work-made-for-hire doctrine provides that, absent a 
signed written agreement to the contrary, an employer is deemed the author of a 
work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment; in addition, “a work 
specially ordered or commissioned” for any of the ten uses specified in § 101 of the 
Copyright Act will also be deemed a work-made-for-hire if the parties expressly 
agree in a written instrument signed by them that it shall be considered as such. 
40 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1570. 
41 Generally, the composer assigns the composition copyright to a music 
publishing company for administration of rights, which includes, among other 
things, seeking opportunities for exploitation of the composition and issuing licenses 
for use. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC 
BUSINESS 222 (9th ed. 2017). 
42 See id. at 222–23, 304–05. 
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The three vehicles for controlling the use of music 
compositions and generating royalties are mechanical licensing 
and non-dramatic performance rights licensing, the primary two, 
and “everything else.”  Mechanical licenses—for the right to 
record a song and distribute the recording in any format—may be 
issued by the music publisher directly or, more likely, by a 
mechanical licensing agent such as the Harry Fox Agency, which 
also issues most mechanical licenses for covers.43  Non-dramatic 
public performance licensing covers everything from playing 
songs on radio and television, to karaoke and jukeboxes, to 
playing music in various public spaces, including restaurants, 
elevators, bars, stadiums, and live concerts.44  Performing rights 
societies (“PRSs”), such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, monitor 
public performance of compositions and manage royalties 
generated from PRS blanket licenses issued to third parties for 
the right to play all songs that are represented by the specific 
PRS.45  The music publishing company handles all other 
licensing, including for use of the composition in domestic films, 
television and radio commercials, video games, webcasting, 
podcasting, and video streaming, 46 as well as grand performance 
rights use in dramatic works, such as plays and operas. 
2. Controlling Sound Recording Copyright Exploitation 
As a direct result of the copyright ownership allocation 
achieved through express written assignment required in most 
recording agreements, the record label, not the recording artist, 
controls the use of the sound recordings that embody the 
 
43 The Harry Fox Agency is a popular clearing house for this purpose. See HFA: 
A Legacy of Trust, A Commitment to New Technology, HFA, 
https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/aboutus.html. 
44 See, e.g., ASCAP Publisher Agreements and Writer Agreements ¶ 9, ASCAP, 
https://www.ascap.com/about/join/membership-agreement (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) 
(defining “public performance” as “vocal, instrumental and/or mechanical renditions 
and representations in any manner or by any method whatsoever, including 
transmissions by radio and television broadcasting stations, transmission by 
telephony and/or ‘wired wireless’; and/or reproductions of performances and 
renditions by means of devices for reproducing sound recorded in synchronism or 
timed relation with the taking of motion pictures”). 
45 Music publishers may affiliate with one or more of the PRSs for non-exclusive 
administration of the publisher’s catalog of copyright interests, while composers may 
individually affiliate with the PRS of their choice, for non-exclusive administration 
of all their composition copyrights. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 238–39. 
46 See id. at 244–59. 
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recording artist’s performance.47  That said, while digital 
performance use for interactive internet services can be 
negotiated, there is no control to be had over digital transmission 
public performances by non-interactive internet service providers 
that qualify for the compulsory license under § 114 of the Act.  
SoundExchange, an independent digital performance rights 
organization, functions as a monitoring service for public 
performances of the sound recording by digital transmission; it 
collects and distributes the royalties paid, but, in contrast to the 
PRSs which issue blanket licenses, SoundExchange does not 
control which recordings are played by which third parties.48 
Record labels also control licensing of the masters for the use 
of a sound recording in a film, television show, commercial, or 
video game.49  In some cases, depending upon the degree of 
bargaining power the recording artist had at the time of the 
recording contract negotiations, the recording contract may 
require the record label to seek the artist’s consent for certain 
uses of the sound recordings produced under the recording 
contract.  But, more often than not, the record label has full 
control over the issuance of master licenses. 
3. Required Copyright Licenses for Third Party Use of Songs 
The most common harms to personhood rights for music 
vocalists are caused by use for objectionable political 
associations, commercials, soundtracks, and derivative musical 
 
47 Howard Cockrill, Tuning the Dial on Internet Radio: The DPRA, the DMCA & 
the General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. 
BULL. 103, 105 (2005). See also Richard Salmon, Recording Contracts Explained, 
SOUND ON SOUND (Apr. 2007), https://www.soundonsound.com/music-business/ 
recording-contracts-explained. 
48 Rather, it collects royalties due from service providers who stream music 
content, allocates the fees collected to recordings based upon frequency of song play, 
and then pays out those royalties, with 45% going to the featured recording artist(s), 
5% to a fund for non-featured artists, and 50% to the sound recording copyright 
owner. See About Digital Royalties, SOUND EXCHANGE, https://www.sound 
exchange.com/artist-copyright-owner/digital-royalties/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). 
49 The owners of sound recording copyrights grant synchronization licenses 
required for use in such works. Resources & Learning: Licensing, RECORDING 
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, https://www.riaa.com/resources-learning/ 
licensing/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). Because record labels are the owners of such 
sound recording copyrights, they possess the right to grant such licenses. See 
Cockrill, supra note 47. See also Salmon, supra note 47. See also I’m Making a Short 
Film And Want to Add Music, But How am I Supposed to Contact Famous Artists to 
Get Permission?, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance.org/ca_faq_post/im-
making-short-film-want-add-music-supposed-contact-famous-artists-get-permission/ 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2018). 
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works and sound recordings.  Accordingly, this section provides a 
summary of the interplay between music copyright licensing for 
pertinent third-party use. 
Playing a song or performing a song live at political 
campaign rallies in public forums requires a public performance 
license for the use of the underlying composition, generally 
obtainable from the composition copyright owner’s PRS.50  No 
license from the sound recording copyright owner is required to 
play the song, because there is no non-digital transmission public 
performance right included in the sound recording copyright 
bundle; live performance of the song does not implicate the sound 
recroding copyright at all. 
Playing a song or performing a song live during a live 
television or radio broadcast requires a public performance 
license for the use of the underlying composition; no license from 
the sound recording copyright owner is required for the reasons 
stated directly above.51 
Playing a song or performing a song live during a non-
interactive internet broadcast requires a public performance 
license for the use of the underlying composition; no direct 
license from the sound recording copyright owner is required 
because the digital license for such use of the recording is 
compulsory.52 
Using a song in a television commercial, television show, or 
motion picture film requires a mechanical license for 
reproduction and distribution of the underlying composition and 
a sync license for synchronization of the composition with the 
visual component of the commercial; if—and only if—a 
copyrighted sound recording is used, a master license for the use 
of the sound recording is also required. 
 
50 For example, the McCain-Palin campaign used the song “My Hero” in 
McCain’s 2008 presidential run, and asserted PRS blanket licenses in response to 
objections from musician-songwriter Dave Grohl, who was an Obama supporter. 
Chao, supra note 10. Palin continued to use the song “Barracuda” as her theme song, 
despite the cease-and-desist letter from the composer-performers, asserting she had 
a blanket license. Id. See also Resources & Learning: For Political Campaigns, 
RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, https://www.riaa.com/resources-
learning/for-political-campaigns/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). 
51 Joy Butler, Music Licensing: The Difference Between Public Performance and 
Synchronization Licenses, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER (May 16, 2017), 
http://www.copyright.com/blog/music-licensing-public-performance-license-
synchronization/. See also Cockrill, supra note 47. 
52 Cockrill, supra note 47, at 105. 
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Using a sound recording in another sound recording, such as 
for sampling or a recorded mash-up, requires a mechanical 
license from the composer for reproduction and distribution of 
the underlying composition, and a master license from the sound 
recording copyright owner, for copying and distribution of the 
master and use to create a derivative work.53 
II. THE NATURE OF LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CREATIVE WORKS 
The objective of this Part is to provide a foundational 
framework for discussion and argument regarding the gap in 
protection of music vocalists’ rights from a personhood 
perspective on the justification for copyright law, as well as for 
the justification for inalienability of a right aimed at filling that 
gap, subject only to contemporaneous license.  The focus here is 
on the concepts and terminology of the philosophical 
justifications for copyright law. Intentionally omitted—as beyond 
the scope of this Article—is examination of whether a particular 
ideology is attributable to or can be extrapolated from Kantian or 
Hegelian ideology regarding tangible property rights or authorial 
rights in literary works and artworks.54 
 
 
53 Id. 
54 Numerous scholars assert that, as they relate to personhood justifications for 
intellectual property, monist copyright theory in the civil law context is derived from 
the works of Immanuel Kant, while the dualist theory in the civil law context is 
derived from the works of Georg Hegel. See, e.g., Troutt, supra  note 1, at 389 
(Hegelian theory acknowledges “the unique character of creation that goes beyond 
the establishment of exclusive rights incident to the mere execution of labor”); 
Robert Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the 
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1977 (2006); Bird & Ponte, supra note 
21, at 213–14, 218 (philosophies of Hegel support the notion that property rights 
that “promote self-expression and human development” are superior rights of 
“paramount importance”); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the 
Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 
12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 20–21 (1992); Lacey, supra note 5, at 1541–42 
(“Intellectual property theorists following Hegel’s and Kant’s thoughts on the 
subject, contend that the personhood theory of property is especially true when the 
property is a work of art.”). Others criticize the conventional wisdom regarding the 
Kantian and Hegelian philosophical bases for the relationship between personhood 
theory and copyright. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Personhood Revisited, 
FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN LAW, PAPER 423 (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/423; Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, 
Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1059, 1071–74 (2008) (arguing that conventional reliance on Kantian theory to 
support the concept of authors’ property-based personality rights is misplaced). 
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A. Philosophical Justifications: Natural Rights, Utilitarianism, 
and Personhood 
“Two main functions of any property theory are the general 
justification of property rights and their delineation.”55  The 
discourse on justifications for intellectual property centers on 
three theories that serve as the dominant philosophical 
underpinnings for tangible property rights: labor-desert or 
natural rights theory, utilitarian theory, and personhood 
theory.56  Each is discussed in turn. 
1. Natural Rights/Desert Theory 
Natural rights or desert theory derives from John Locke’s 
basic premise regarding tangible property that one ought to reap 
the fruits of his labor and “ ‘whenever one mingles his effort with 
the raw stuff of the world, any resulting product ought—simply 
ought—to be his.’ ”57  With respect to intellectual property, the 
natural rights theory provides that “ ‘a man’s right to the produce 
of his brain is equally valid with his right to the produce of his 
hands.’ ”58 Discussing copyright law in his treatise, Blackstone 
extended Lockean theory beyond mere possession justification 
into the realm of control:  
When a man, by the exertion of his rational powers has 
produced an original work, he seems to clearly have a right to 
dispose of that identical work as he pleases, and any attempt to 
vary the disposition he has made of it, appears to be an invasion 
of that right [of property].59 
 
55 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 
(1982). 
56 See id. at 958 (identifying Lockean labor-desert theory and utilitarian theory 
as “the most prevalent traditional lines of liberal property theory,” and discussing 
personhood theory as a third strand); see also Troutt, supra note 1, at 381–89 
(discussing utility and personality as the theoretical framework for property rights 
in music). 
57 Lacey, supra note 5, at 1539 (citing J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 
in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ch. 5 §§ 27-30. (P. Laslett ed. 1960) and Frank 
I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations 
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1204 (1967)). 
58 Id. (citing H. SPENSER, SOCIAL STATICS 68 (rev. ed. 1896)). 
59 Id. at 1539–40 (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 405). 
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2. Utilitarianism 
Utilitarian theory focuses on maximization of social 
welfare.60  As stated in Part I, U.S. copyright law and patent law 
is primarily focused on maximizing public access to intellectual 
property and spawning additional works for social benefit; 
exclusive rights to be exploited for economic benefits to the 
copyright owner are the means of achieving that primary 
objective.61  The emphasis on social utility is evident in the 
constitutionally sanctioned power of Congress to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings . . . .”62  It is further evidenced in the copyright context 
by the statutory fair use doctrine and the long list of other 
exceptions to a United States copyright owner’s exclusive rights 
to exploit his or her works.63  The inclusion of economic rewards 
to the copyright owner is secondary, as evidenced by various 
Supreme Court opinions.64  Thus, U.S. copyright law is based 
primarily upon utilitarianism, and secondarily upon labor-desert 
or natural rights theory. 
3. Personhood or Personality Theory 
Personhood theory “focuses on personal embodiment or self-
constitution in terms of ‘things.’ ”65  In her article exploring the 
relationship between property and personhood, and “how the 
personhood perspective can help decide specific disputes between 
rival claimants,” Professor Margaret Jane Radin explained:  
“Once we admit that a person can be bound up with an external  
 
 
 
 
60 See Radin, supra note 55, at 958. 
61 See also Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, ch. 19 at 1482. (A. Mitchell Polinmsky & 
Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
63 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (2012). All exclusive rights for any copyrighted work 
are subject to the “fair use” limitation set forth in § 107 of the Act. Copyright fair use 
essentially exempts certain unauthorized uses from copyright infringement liability. 
Applicability of the defense is determined by consideration of the purpose and 
character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and 
substantiality of the work used, and the impact of the use on the potential market or 
value of the work. 
64 See Netanel, supra note 54, at 9–10. 
65 Radin, supra note 55, at 958. 
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‘thing’ in some constitutive sense, we can argue that by virtue of 
this connection the person should be accorded broad liberty with 
respect to control over that ‘thing.’ ”66 
Personhood or personality theory as a justification for 
intellectual property, then, is based on the premise that property 
which is an extension or embodiment of the individual’s 
personality, particularly with respect to artistic creations, gives 
rise to a greater entitlement or a stronger moral claim than other 
property.67  Supremacy of the artist’s personhood is deemed 
essential to incentivizing intellectual creativity, as well as to 
justifying artist control, and economic incentives are 
subordinated.68  Although one noted problem with the personality 
justification is that there are some forms of intellectual property 
which simply do not appear to manifest the personality of their 
creators, musical performance, and particularly vocal 
performance, does not present that problem.69 
As referenced, supra, the Ninth Circuit—having 
responsibility for one of the two heaviest dockets of music-related 
cases of all federal appellate courts in the nation—explicitly 
acknowledged that a “human voice is one of the most palpable 
ways identity is manifested,” and on that basis a “singer 
manifests herself in the song.”70  Accordingly, personhood theory 
supports protection of vocalists’ personality interests arguably 
more so than any other author, particularly given the instant 
recognition and association of the vocalist’s voice with the 
vocalist’s person. 
 
 
66 Id. at 958, 960. Radin then developed an intuitive “personhood perspective” to 
create objective criteria that could differentiate good identification with objects, 
which is worthy of recognition, from bad identification or fetishism, which is not. Id. 
at 968–69. 
67 See, e.g., Corinna Coors, Morality, Utility, Reality? Justifying Celebrity Rights 
in the 21st Century, 44 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 215, 227 (2017) (discussing 
personality theory as justification for right of publicity). 
68 See id. 
69 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 340 
(1988) (discussing right of publicity and identifying musical works, along with 
poems, stories, novels, sculpture, paintings, and prints as being among those works 
that are “clearly receptacles for personality,” and identifying works that do not 
appear to manifest personality). 
70 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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B. Moral Rights Defined 
Moral rights are rights in creative works that belong 
exclusively to the natural person who authors the work; they are 
not available to corporate entities, and they are generally 
inalienable.71  The moral rights doctrine, as originally developed 
in France, includes four core moral rights.  The right of 
disclosure gives a creative work author the sole right to 
determine whether, when, and how the work will be made 
available for public viewing.72  The corollary right of withdrawal 
conditionally allows the artist to withdraw the work from public 
display and dissemination.  The right of attribution, or right of 
paternity, assures that only the author will be identified as the 
creator.  And the right of integrity empowers the artist to 
prohibit mutilation, material alteration, distortion, and 
destruction of the work, as well as to prohibit use or display of 
the work in a context or manner that is derogatory or otherwise 
harmful to the author’s honor and reputation, or contrary to the 
author’s intentions.73 
Together these moral rights, which are generally inalienable, 
provide the author of a creative work with a means to control 
third party use and exploitation of a work, from creation to post-
release of the work for public consumption, throughout the 
duration of the work’s existence, or, at least, for the author’s 
lifetime.74  They also provide a means of maintaining and 
controlling the author’s personal connection to the work, thereby 
limiting the degree of alienation after physical embodiments of 
the work are transferred to another, and even after certain 
intangible rights in the work are transferred to another.75 
C. Civil Law Nations vs. Common Law Nations and Monist vs. 
Dualist Perspectives 
Nations are said to differ in the nature and scope of legal 
protections for creative works, depending, generally, upon 
whether they are a civil law nation or a common law nation.  The 
 
71 See Petrik, supra note 19, at 366–67, 367 n.32. 
72 See id. at 363. 
73 See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 21, at 220–21; Cyrill P. Rigamonti, 
Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 362–64 (2006) (discussing the 
four rights in the context of Continental Europe); Lacey, supra note 5, at 1549 
(discussing the four rights recognized under French doctrine). 
74 See Rigamonti, supra note 73, at 355–56. 
75 See Petrik, supra note 19, at 367. 
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United States is known to adhere to the common law system of 
copyright protection derived from the common law and copyright 
statutes of the United Kingdom, while Continental Europe 
adheres to a civil law system, which evolved primarily in France 
and Germany.76  The systems diverge primarily with respect to 
their view on the purpose of and philosophical basis for copyright 
law, which then leads to divergent views on protection of 
personhood interests and the related handling of moral rights 
aimed at protecting those interests.77 
Defining “the adoption of civil-law-style moral rights 
legislation” as a “major shift in terms of copyright theory,” 
Professor Cyrill Rigamonti explained the distinction between 
civil law nations and common law nations as follows: 
[I]t had been a canon of comparative copyright scholarship that 
the most significant difference between Anglo-American and 
Continental European copyright law was their respective 
attitudes toward moral rights.  The inclusion of moral rights in 
statutory copyright law was generally understood to be the 
defining feature of the Continental copyright tradition, while 
the lack of statutory moral rights protection was considered to 
be a crucial component of the Anglo-American copyright 
tradition.  This dichotomy had been celebrated and cultivated 
since World War II on both sides of the Atlantic to the point 
where the statutory protection of moral rights or the lack 
thereof had become an integral part of each legal system’s 
identity, essentially dividing the world of copyright into two 
fundamentally different ideal types, one that includes moral 
rights, and another that excludes moral rights.  The common 
law courts were fully aware of this dichotomy, and while they 
recognized the existence of the concept of moral rights in civil 
law countries, they uniformly rejected its applicability in their 
own jurisdictions.78 
 
 
76 See, e.g., Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests:  The Concordance of 
Copyright Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 601, 602 (2001). 
77 See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in 
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, passim (1990) 
(demonstrating that prior to the French revolution, copyright law in France and the 
United States was quite similar, and attributing the divergence in the regimes to 
“development of personalist doctrines, such as moral rights, by French copyright 
scholars and courts”). 
78 Rigamonti, supra note 73, at 354 (footnotes omitted). 
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Other scholars have distinguished the nations’ approaches—
categorizing them as monist or dualistic—based upon the 
treatment of moral or personality rights and economic rights in 
creative works, rather than based upon the total absence of 
moral rights.79 
The dualistic perspective, typically associated with civil law 
nations, considers as distinct elements for protection the 
property/economic rights and the moral/personal rights,80 
employing, at times, copyright law to the former and neighboring 
rights laws to the latter.81  French copyright law based on 
author’s rights or the droit d’auteur, for example, is said to reflect 
the civil law, dual nature approach.  It specifies an “exclusive 
incorporeal property right” in an author’s works, including 
“attributes of an intellectual and moral nature,” which are 
“perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible,” as well as 
“attributes of an economic nature,” which are limited in duration 
and assignable independent of the moral rights.82 Scholar Neil 
Netanel cautions, however:  “The dual character of French droits 
d’auteur should not be overemphasized . . . French commentators 
speak of the interdependence of the moral and economic rights, 
and indeed, of the predominance of the former over the latter.”83 
The monist legal perspective, typically associated with 
common law nations, considers moral rights to be “rolled into the 
general protections afforded a creator’s property or economic 
rights under copyright,” instead of recognizing moral rights 
separately.84  For example, German copyright law follows the 
monist approach to droit d’auteur, pursuant to which “economic 
and moral rights are considered thoroughly intertwined so that 
both aspects of copyright cannot be dissociated from each 
other.”85  Based upon that view, the German Copyright Act 
permits transfer of copyright ownership by testamentary 
disposition, but otherwise deems the copyright inalienable, 
 
79 See Bird & Ponte, supra note 21, at 213–14. 
80 See id. 
81 See Netanel, supra note 54, at 22–23 (citing HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT 
D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 275 (3d ed. 1978)). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Bird & Ponte, supra note 21, at 214. 
85 Reto M. Hilty & Alexander Peukert, “Equitable Remuneration” in Copyright 
Law:  The Amended German Copyright Act as a Trap for the Entertainment Industry 
in the U.S.?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 401, 406–07 (2004). 
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subject to licensing of the economic rights only.86  But these 
exploitation rights still remain secondary, so-called “daughter” 
rights, that are always bound to “mother” rights that stay with 
the author.87  “All rights revert to the author upon termination of 
an exploitation contract.”88 
The United States adheres to a pseudo monist legal 
perspective; “pseudo” because copyright protection in the United 
States emphasizes economic rights, but rather than being “rolled 
up” with the economic rights, moral rights are largely 
disregarded.89 
III. TREATY-RELATED U.S. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS TOUCHING 
MORAL RIGHTS 
The United States is a signatory to two major international 
agreements—the Berne Convention and the WIPO’s 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”)—which require 
provision of the moral rights of integrity and attribution, in 
accord with Continental influences.  Yet, the United States has 
continued its adherence to a copyright regime which ignores 
moral rights for most authors of copyrightable works.  The WPPT 
specifically applies to music vocalists, among other performers.90  
Although the Berne Convention does not apply to music 
 
86 Id. at 407–08 (“[T]he author may grant an economic right to another to use 
the work in a particular manner. An exploitation right may be granted as a non-
exclusive or exclusive right and may be limited in respect to time, place or 
purpose.”). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 408. 
89 See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(“American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or 
provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the 
economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.”); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 
F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (where artist contracted with publisher to produce art 
work for use by publisher in its publication under terms of which artist completely 
divested himself of title and ownership of pictures as well as rights to their 
possession, control, and use, artist could not enjoin publisher from reproducing 
pictures produced by him without his name appearing thereon and without credit to 
him on ground that it violated his so-called “moral rights”). 
90 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 2(a), Dec. 20, 1996, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295477 [hereinafter WPPT] 
(“ ‘[P]erformers’ are actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, 
sing, deliver, declaim, play in, interpret or otherwise perform literary or artistic 
works or expressions of folklore.”). 
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performers,91 a discussion of its implementation in the United 
States is warranted due to the negative impact it has had on 
music performers, notwithstanding its inapplicability. 
A. Pertinent Effects of the Berne Convention Implementation Act 
of 1988 
The Berne Convention was established as an international 
agreement for the protection of the rights of authors in their 
literary and artistic works.92  Article 6bis, first added by 
amendment in 1928 and later broadened by amendment in 
1972,93 mandates provision of a right of attribution and a right of 
integrity for the life of the artist, at a minimum, but leaves to 
each signatory the means of provision and enforcement.94   
Exploring comparative historical compliance, and clarifying the 
public international standard for compliance with Article 6bis, 
Professor Justin Hughes noted that “[r]espectable adherence to 
[Article 6bis] historically did not require express statutory 
provisions establishing the two moral rights.”95  Moral rights 
were not codified in France, the country of their origin, until 
1957, long after the 1928 amendment adding Article 6bis, and 
“most major common law countries—and several significant civil 
 
91 Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 2(1) (excluding any mention of music 
performance and sound recordings from the definition of the covered “literary and 
artistic works”). 
92 See id. at 4; Kwall, supra note 54, at 1954 n.38. 
93 Bella Karakis, Moral Rights: French, United States and Soviet Compliance 
with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 5 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 105, 109–10 (1994). 
94 Article 6bis provides as follows: 
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, 
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of 
the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions 
authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. 
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their 
ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection 
after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding 
paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, 
cease to be maintained. 
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article 
shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is 
claimed. 
Berne Convention, supra note 20, at 7. 
95 Hughes, supra note 21, at 706. 
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law countries—were members of the Berne Convention for 
decades before they passed moral rights statutes for the two 
Article 6bis rights.”96  These countries relied on their existing 
domestic laws, prior to finally codifying moral rights provisions.97 
The United States became a signatory in 1988 and enacted 
the Berne Convention Implementation Act (the “BCIA”), effective 
March 1, 1989.98   The near-century-long delay in the United 
States’ accession to the Berne Convention is partially attributed 
to “debate over the requirements of Article 6bis,” “whether [it] 
required the United States to enact new laws protecting moral 
rights,” and a concern of “[c]ertain proprietary groups” that even 
without new laws, “the very fact of adherence could work a 
gradual but substantial change in the American copyright system 
and the protections accorded authors.”99 
Congress intentionally did not incorporate moral rights into 
the Copyright Act or provide an express grant by any other 
means after becoming a Berne signatory.  In the course of 
enacting the BCIA, Congress acknowledged that no federal 
statute provided for moral rights and that “various decisions of 
state and federal courts [had] rejected claims that were 
denominated specifically as ‘moral rights’ or that sought relief 
under the ‘moral rights’ doctrine.”100  Nonetheless, Congress 
concluded that protection of the moral rights mandated by Article 
6bis was provided under then existing law, including “various 
provisions of the Copyright Act and Lanham Act, various state 
 
96 Id. 
97 Professor Hughes explained that the United Kingdom, a civil nation, had 
“concluded that moral rights as such were unknown in English jurisprudence and a 
matter best left to ‘contract between the parties concerned,’ ” before codifying “a 
small piece of a modern statutory moral-rights system” in its 1956 copyright law 
revision to narrowly address false attribution; and, it was not until 1988 that the 
United Kingdom passed legislation covering both Article 6bis rights, relying until 
then on “a composite of contract law and common law” torts such as “defamation, 
injurious falsehood, passing-off, and privacy violations.” Id. at 707. New Zealand 
adopted the U.K. moral rights statute in 1994, while Australia did not codify moral 
rights provisions until 2000. Id. at 708. Similarly, Switzerland relied on its Civil 
Code protections of “an individual’s right of personality, including honor, reputation, 
and privacy,” from 1887 to 1992, when it finally codified provisions recognizing 
Article 6bis rights. Id. at 708–09. 
98 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 
2853; H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917 
[hereinafter “BCIA”]. 
99 H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917 
(legislative history for Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), background). 
100 S. Res. No. 100-352, at 9–10 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 
3714–15. 
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statutes, and common law principles such as libel, defamation, 
misrepresentation, and unfair competition, which have been 
applied by courts to redress authors’ invocation of the right to 
claim authorship or the right to object to distortion.”101  As 
Professor Hughes points outs, “[t]his patchwork protection was 
not an ingenious, last minute creation of Capitol Hill staff in 
1988; it had a long conceptual and practical history,” appearing 
in legal literature as early as 1940, and subsequently in a 1959 
“detailed study on the issue . . . as part of the long review of 
[U.S.] copyright law that contributed to the 1976 Act.”102 
The BCIA cemented the intended omission of new moral 
rights law by expressly providing that: (i) the Berne Convention 
provisions are “not self-executing under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States,” (ii) United States obligations 
thereunder “may be performed only pursuant to appropriate 
domestic law,” and (iii) “no further rights or interests shall be 
recognized or created for that purpose.”103  The BCIA expressly 
negated any right to file a lawsuit to directly enforce the 
provisions of the Berne Convention and it expressly denied any 
change, whether under federal, state, or common law, to an 
author’s right to claim authorship of a work or to “object to any 
distortion, mutilation, or other medication of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to the work, that would prejudice the author’s 
honor or reputation.”104 
Although the United States was not alone in its reliance on 
non-copyright domestic laws to support its adherence to Article 
6bis,105 the BCIA did not simply leave United States authors on 
the same footing they were on prior to its enactment.  Sections 1 
and 2 of the BCIA confirmed the preeminence of domestic law, 
but also established rules of construction which effectively 
directed courts not to consider Article 6bis adherence obligations 
in the course of applying the domestic law relied upon to satisfy 
those obligations. 
The BCIA provided for numerous significant amendments to 
the Copyright Act, which took effect in March 1989, although 
none extended the right of attribution or right of integrity to all 
 
101 Id. 
102 Hughes, supra note, 21, at 666 & nn.34–35. 
103 BCIA, supra note, 98, § 2. 
104 Id. § 3. 
105 Hughes, supra note 21, at 707–09. 
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authors, as is mandatory under the Berne Convention.106  Two 
amendments are of specific import here.  Section 104 of the 
Copyright Act, regarding “[s]ubject matter of copyright,” was 
amended to add subpart (c): 
(c) EFFECT OF BERNE CONVENTION. — No right or interest 
in a work eligible for protection under this title may be claimed 
by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne 
Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto.  Any 
rights in a work eligible for protection under this title that 
derive from this title, other Federal or State statutes, or the 
common law, shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of, or in 
reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the 
adherence of the United States thereto.107 
Section 301 of the Act, regarding “[p]reemption with respect to 
other laws”108 was amended to add subpart (e) as follows:  “(e) 
The scope of Federal preemption under this section is not 
affected by the adherence of the United States to the Berne 
Convention or the satisfaction of obligations of the United States 
thereunder.”109 
These two BCIA amendments to the Copyright Act, together 
with the subsequent enactment of VARA110, have worked to 
thwart numerous attempts by U.S. authors to use existing 
federal or state statutory law, as well as common law, to enforce 
the spirit of the rights of attribution and integrity the United 
States is obligated to provide under the Berne Convention.  
Consequently, as will be demonstrated infra, U.S. music authors 
were put in a worse position with respect to moral rights than 
they were in prior to the BCIA. 
 
106 BCIA, supra note 98. 
107 Id. § 4; see also 17 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2002). 
108 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1998) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or 
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright as specified by § 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as 
specified by §§ 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether 
published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no 
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the 
common law or statutes of any State.”). 
109 BCIA, supra note 98, § 6 (“Preemption With Respect To Other Laws Not 
Affected”). 
110 VARA has been criticized as noncompliant with Article 6bis. See, e.g., 
Hughes, supra note 21, at 671–74. 
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B. WIPO’s Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
The WPPT was adopted in 1996, to provide new “protection 
for performers of audio works and producers of phonograms (i.e., 
sound recordings).”111  The United States, an original signatory, 
enacted the WIPO Copyright and Performers and Phonograms 
Treaty Implementation Act of 1997 (“WCPPTIA”), effective in full 
as of May 20, 2002.112 
As mentioned above, the WPPT includes music vocalists in 
the definition of performers, while it defines a “producer of a 
phonogram” to mean the person or entity that “takes the 
initiative and has the responsibility for the first fixation of the 
sounds of a performance.”113  Parallel to Article 6bis with respect 
to Berne Convention authors, WPPT Article 5(1) mandates 
provision of a right of attribution and a right of integrity for the 
life of the performer, at a minimum, but leaves to each signatory 
the means of provision and enforcement as follows: 
 (1) Independently of a performer’s economic rights, and even 
after the transfer of those rights, the performer shall, as regards 
his live aural performances or performances fixed in 
phonograms, have the right to claim to be identified as the 
performer of his performances, except where omission is 
dictated by the manner of the use of the performance, and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his 
performance which would be prejudicial to his reputation. 
 (2) The rights granted to a performer in accordance with the 
paragraph (1) shall, after his death, be maintained, at least 
until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable 
by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of 
the [signatory] where protection is claimed.  However, those 
[signatories] whose legislation, at the moment of their 
 
111 S. Exec. Doc. No. 105-25, WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), at 1–2 (Oct. 14, 1998) [hereinafter 
WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept.]. Notably, because the United States protects sound 
recordings under copyright law, it initially pushed for updated protections for sound 
recordings as part of the Berne Protocol process to update the Berne Convention; 
however, “[t]he European Union and many other countries strenuously resisted 
inclusion of sound recording protection because sound recordings are not copyright 
subject matter under their laws nor, they insisted, under the Berne Convention.” Id. 
at 2. “These countries were unwilling to change their theoretical basis for protecting 
sound recordings or agree to an optional interpretation that sound recordings are 
copyright subject matter under the Berne Convention.” Id. at 3. 
112 See WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
Implementation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-1. S. 1121 (Jul. 3, 1997). WPPT, supra 
note 90, at 12. 
113 WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 2(d) (emphasis added). 
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ratification of or accession to this Treaty, does not provide for 
the protection after the death of the performer of all the rights 
set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of 
these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained. 
 (3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by 
this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the 
[signatory] where protection is claimed.114 
In addition to the mandated moral rights—which are not 
granted to producers irrespective of whether the producer is a 
person or an entity—the WPPT mandates that performers have 
the exclusive economic right of authorizing the fixation and 
public broadcast of their unfixed performances.115  As a result of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, U.S. performers have had 
these additional exclusive rights regarding unfixed performances 
since 1994 via § 1101 of the Copyright Act, which prohibits 
unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and 
music videos subject to the same remedies provided for copyright 
infringement.116 
Otherwise, the rights of performers and producers under the 
WPPT include: a common right to compensation for public 
performance of sound recordings, subject to limited or complete 
reservation,117 and parallel exclusive rights of reproduction, 
distribution, commercial rental, and the making available by 
wire or wireless means for interactive, digital on-demand public 
access, with the distinction being that performers’ exclusive 
rights are in their performances, while producers’ exclusive 
rights are in their sound recordings.118  The Committee on 
Foreign Relations explained: 
These above-mentioned [parallel] rights may be exercised 
separately by the performers and producers.  Permission from both 
the performer and the producer must be obtained for a third-party to  
 
 
 
114 Id. at art. 5 (“Moral Rights of Performers”). 
115 Id. at art. 6 (“Economic Rights of Performers in their Unfixed 
Performances”). 
116 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 1101 (2012); see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
adding chapter 11, entitled “Sound Recordings and Music Videos,” to title 17. Pub. L. 
No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4974. 
117 WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 15 (“Right to Remuneration for Broadcasting 
and Communication to the Public”). 
118 Compare id. at art. 7–10, with id. at art. 11–14 (rights of reproduction, 
distribution, rental, and making available fixed performances (for performers) and 
sound recordings (for producers)). 
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reproduce, distribute, rent, or make available a phonogram (subject 
of course to any limitations on these rights legislated pursuant to 
Article 16),119  
which makes all rights under the WPPT (including the moral 
rights) subject to fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act, as 
well as all other limitations and restrictions provided for in 
§§ 108–122.120 
All except the moral rights apply retroactively to any works 
that were not in the public domain as of the date of entry into 
force.121  The expanded digital performance right added in 1998 
by the DMCA appears to satisfy the common right to 
remuneration for public performance, subject to a reservation 
that the right only applies to digital performances.  At first 
glance, it also appears to satisfy the parallel exclusive “making 
available . . .” rights, except that the digital performance right 
under § 106 belongs only to the owner of the sound recording 
copyright, and thus likely excludes the performer’s separate 
exclusive right from the very start, as a matter of music industry 
practice whereby that copyright is rather automatically 
transferred to the record label.122  The same issue exists for the 
parallel exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, and rental 
of the performer’s “performance[] fixed in phonogram” and the 
producer’s phonograms.123  Even if performers were deemed joint 
authors of a sound recording and thus joint copyright owners 
along with the record label as the producer, only one 
author/owner’s permission would be required for a third party to 
reproduce or distribute the sound recording.124  Thus, the 
intended co-existing mutually exclusive rights in the fixed  
 
 
 
119 WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept., supra note 111, at 9 (emphasis added). 
120 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (providing various limitations on exclusive rights); 
see also WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 16. 
121 WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 22; Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 18; 
see also WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept., supra note 111, at 13–14. 
122 17 U.S.C. § 106(6); see also John P. Strohm, Writings in the Margin (Of 
Error): The Authorship of Sound Recordings under United States Copyright Law, 34 
CUMB. L. REV. 127, 130 (2003). 
123 Summary of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (1996), 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/ 
wppt/summary_wppt.html (last visited September 21, 2018 2:45 PM). 
124 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); see also Benjamin E. Jaffe, Rebutting the Equality 
Principle: Adapting the Co-Tenancy Law Model to Enhance the Remedies Available 
to Joint Copyright Owners, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1555 (2011). 
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performance for the performer and in the sound recording for the 
producer are conflated with exclusive rights in the sound 
recording under U.S. copyright law. 
Nothing was done to remedy the conflation.  The substantive 
amendments to the Copyright Act contained in the WCT & 
WPPT Implementation Act focused almost entirely on what was 
necessary to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty.125  There 
were no amendments adding new rights for music performers.  In 
particular, § 106 was not amended to reflect the exclusive rights 
of performers in their fixed performances, nor was § 102 
amended to reflect statutory recognition of music performance as 
a copyrightable work, once fixed.  Reminiscent of the legislature’s 
stance regarding Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, the stated 
presumption of the Committee on Foreign Relations regarding 
WPPT was that: 
The United States presumably will continue to rely upon 
copyright law as the primary vehicle for sound recording 
protection, supplemented by criminal penalties for knowing 
infringements for purposes of commercial gain.  In addition to 
federal law, the United States may rely in part on state 
statutory and common law to satisfy some treaty obligations.126 
Consequently, there exists a gap in the WPPT protections 
the United States is obligated to provide with respect to the 
moral rights of attribution and integrity for music performers, as 
well as the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution for 
music performers in their fixed performances. 
IV. THE INCREASING INEFFICACY OF ALTERNATIVE LEGAL 
THEORIES IN LIEU OF MORAL RIGHTS 
Upon considering claims sounding in moral rights, courts 
have consistently held that there is no recognition of moral rights 
within the United States, even in instances where the court went 
on to grant some relief.127  Courts have also consistently rejected 
 
125 See WCT & WPPT Implementation Act, ch. 12, Public Law 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998) (amending the Copyright Act by adding § 1201 (circumvention of 
copyright protection systems), § 1202 (integrity of copyright management 
information), § 1203 (civil remedies), and § 1204 (criminal offenses and penalties)). 
126 WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept., supra note 111, at 8. 
127 See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1392 n.10 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[U]nder 
copyright law, while a licensor has no ‘moral right’ to control the quality of licensed 
depictions she may insist, contractually, on approval provisions to ‘assure quality 
control and high standards in the exploitation’ of her creative work.”) (internal 
citations omitted); Gilliam v. ABC, 538. F.2d 14, 23–24 (2d Cir. 1976) (granting relief 
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claimed trademark rights in “signature songs” as a basis for 
trademark infringement claims brought against third parties 
using the songs without the music vocalist’s permission.128  
Otherwise, in the realm of redress sought for harms to 
personhood there has been little consistency from case to case. 
Whether an author has obtained relief under an alternative 
theory has depended upon the luck of the draw regarding who, 
what, where, when, and how.  Who were the parties?  What 
theory could be made to fit the harm?  Where was the venue or 
court of jurisdiction?  When was the claim brought, pre- or post-
BCIA?  How bad was the alleged wrongful conduct? 
As the Second Circuit has made plain:  “American courts 
have in varying degrees acknowledged the idea of moral rights, 
cloaking the concept in the guise of other legal theories, such as 
copyright, unfair competition, invasion of privacy, defamation, 
and breach of contract.”129  In her 1985 article exploring the 
interplay between the then-recently enacted 1976 Act and the 
moral rights doctrine, Professor Roberta Kwall observed that: 
The overwhelming number of commentators who have studied 
this question have concluded that the scope of protection in 
America for the personal rights of creators is insufficient.  The 
criticism is not surprising given that patchwork measures 
rarely approximate the degree of protection afforded by a 
cohesive legal theory whose exclusive objective is the specific 
protection of precise interests. 
 
Although the substitute theories [mainly “unfair competition, 
breach of contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy”] afford 
creators varying levels of protection for their moral rights, 
American creators typically are at a relative disadvantage 
compared to creators in moral right countries.  The major 
difficulty facing American creators is the additional burden of 
molding moral rights claims into other recognized causes of 
action. Given that all of the substitute theories are supported by 
a theoretical basis different from that of the moral right doctrine, 
a successful claim may require elements of proof which are not 
applicable directly to a moral rights claim.  The moral right 
doctrine is concerned with the creator’s personality rights and 
society’s interest in preserving the integrity of its culture.  These 
 
via contract law, copyright law, and unfair competition law); Franconero v. 
Universal Music Corp., No. 02 Civ.1963(RO), 2003 WL 22990060 at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 19, 2003) (denying relief). 
128 See infra Part IV.b.3. 
129 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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interests are not the exclusive, or even the primary, focus of any 
of the substitute theories, all of which developed in response to 
completely different social concerns.130 
Still, the odds for a favorable outcome were better prior to the 
BCIA. 
A. Unfair Competition 
Use of a music composition in a radio or television 
commercial requires license from the music composition 
copyright owner, and use of the performance master as well 
requires an additional license from the sound recording copyright 
owner.  If the music vocalist owns neither copyright—which is 
more often the case than not—then copyright law does not 
require the vocalist’s permission at all.  For playing of a sound 
recording in a public arena, like at a political campaign rally, 
permission is not required from even a vocalist with ownership of 
the sound recording copyright, because sound recordings have no 
public performance rights as part of their copyright bundle, aside 
from the digital right.131 
Consequently, for decades music vocalists have turned to 
unfair competition, seeking relief from unwanted associations 
with politicians and commercial products and services and other 
objectionable uses of their songs.  The degree of success in 
asserting unfair competition claims has depended, primarily, on 
whether the claim was one for false designation or trademark 
infringement or false endorsement, the timing of the claim, and 
whether the claim was based on use of the vocalist’s actual 
recorded performance. 
1. False Designation of Origin in Lieu of the Rights of 
Attribution and Integrity 
Pre-BCIA, the outcomes were particularly favorable for 
claims that could be aligned with the theory of false designation 
of origin under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.132  Post-BCIA, such 
 
130 Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 21, at 17–18, 23–24 
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
131 See Patrick Koncel, Did Copyright Kill the Radio Star? Why the Recorded 
Music Industry and Copyright Act Should Welcome Webcasters into the Fold, 14. J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 297–302 (2015); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) 
(2012); id. § 114(a). 
132 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (creating liability for “[a]ny person 
who . . . uses in commerce . . . any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—(A) is likely 
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claims have failed as a substitute for the moral rights required 
under both the Berne Convention and the WPPT, for reasons 
attributable to copyright preemption.133 
a. Pre-BCIA Reliability 
Two successful false designation cases out of the Ninth 
Circuit, Smith v. Montoro134 in 1981 and Lamothe v. Atlantic 
Recording Corp.135 in 1988, concerned the right of attribution for 
an actor on motion picture credits and for two of three joint 
authors on music compositions, respectively.  The Ninth Circuit 
held that relief for misattribution was available under the false 
designation theory of “reverse passing off,” if the rightful name 
was replaced with another or if some, but not all, of the rightful 
names were omitted.136 
An earlier successful case out of the Second Circuit in 1976, 
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Company, Inc.,137 concerned 
the right of integrity; the plaintiffs prevailed on a combination of 
copyright infringement and contract theory, as well as on a 
theory of mutilation of an original work in violation of Lanham 
Act § 43(a).138  The British group of writers and performers 
known as Monty Python won an injunction to stop television 
network ABC from broadcasting edited versions of three 
originally ninety-minute television episodes from which a total of 
twenty-four minutes had been excised to accommodate 
commercial breaks and omit material deemed too offensive or 
obscene.139  As to the claim seeking redress for “actionable 
mutilation” and “deformation of an artist’s work,” for example, 
the claim sounding in right of integrity violation, the court found 
 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, 
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another 
person . . . .”). 
133 Accord Rigamonti, supra note 73, at 355 (arguing in 2006, that “if the goal 
was to increase the overall protection of authors, it was a step in the wrong direction 
for the common law countries to adopt the civil law concept of moral rights, because 
the statutory moral rights regimes that were enacted in the United States and the 
United Kingdom have likely reduced rather than increased the aggregate level of 
authorial protection”). 
134 648 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1981). 
135 847 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988). In Lamothe, the court also held that the 
licensee defendants were liable for the incomplete designations. Id. at 1408. 
136 Id. at 1406–08; Smith, 648 F.2d at 607. 
137 538 F.2d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 1976). 
138 Id. at 23–25. 
139 Id. at 18, 26. 
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a violation of the Lanham Act prohibition against false 
designation, holding that ABC’s broadcast of the edited versions 
“impaired the integrity of the . . . work and represented to the 
public as the product of [the plaintiffs’] what was actually a mere 
caricature of their talents.”140  In so holding, the Second Circuit 
explained its rationale as follows: 
American copyright law, as presently written, does not 
recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their 
violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather 
than the personal, rights of authors.  Nevertheless, the economic 
incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves as the 
foundation for American copyright law, [citations-1], cannot be 
reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for 
mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public on 
which the artists are financially dependent.  Thus courts have 
long granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist’s work by 
relying on theories outside the statutory law of copyright, such 
as contract law, [citations-2], or the tort of unfair competition 
[citations-3].  Although such decisions are clothed in terms of 
proprietary right in one’s creation, they also properly vindicate 
the author’s personal right to prevent the presentation of his 
work to the public in a distorted form. [citations-4]141 
Pre-BCIA, all three of the above-referenced false designation 
cases under Lanham Act § 43(a) were oft-cited decisions and 
reliable precedent for similar sounding claims.  But the home 
that some would-be moral rights claims had found in the federal 
statutory prohibition against false designation of origin was 
obliterated, after a case involving the alleged reverse passing off 
of a documentary films series—Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp.142—reached the Supreme Court. 
 
140 Id. at 24–25. 
141 Id. at 24 (emphasis added). Omitted citations are, respectively: (1) Goldstein 
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 93 S.Ct. 2303, 37 L.Ed.2d 163 (1973); Mazer v. Stein, 347 
U.S. 201, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954); (2) Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d 
Cir. 1952) (substantial cutting of original work constitutes misrepresentation); 
(3) Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass.1939), and 
Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author 128-138, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT (1963); 
and (4) Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d 891, 895-96 (2d Cir. 1937); 
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 568 (1940). But see 
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring) (“So far as the Lanham Act is 
concerned, it is not a substitute for droit moral which authors in Europe enjoy.  If 
the licensee may, by contract, distort the recorded work, the Lanham Act does not 
come into play. If the licensee has no such right by contract, there will be a violation 
in breach of contract.”). 
142 539 U.S. 23, 27 (2003). 
2018] IN LIEU OF MORAL RIGHTS 487 
b. Post-BCIA Claim Failures in the Wake of Dastar 
Notably, Dastar was not a case seeking redress for a would-
be moral rights violation.  Because the copyright for the film 
series had lapsed thereby casting the series into the public 
domain, Fox sought relief on a Lanham Act passing off claim 
instead of asserting copyright infringement, when Dastar slightly 
modified the series, repackaged it, and then sold it under a 
different name without attribution to Fox’s original series.143 
The Dastar Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
affirmation of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and 
held that the term “origin of goods” in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
“refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for 
sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or 
communication embodied in these goods.”144  The Court’s 
rationale was that interpreting § 43(a) otherwise created a 
conflict with copyright law, which allows copying of works in the 
public domain freely and without attribution.145  That rationale 
was certainly consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior firm 
stance against allowing the “misuse or over-extension” of 
Lanham Act claims to circumvent limitations on the scope and 
duration of monopolies afforded under copyright and patent 
law.146  In other words, the Dastar Court was concerned with 
conflict preemption. 
The Dastar opinion cited Smith v. Montoro, among other 
federal circuit cases, for the proposition that “every Circuit to 
consider the issue found § 43(a) broad enough to encompass 
reverse passing off,”147 without expressly overruling Smith v. 
Montoro or Lamothe, and their progeny.  It made no mention of 
Gilliam’s application of Lanham Act § 43 to provide relief for the 
 
143 Id. at 26–27. 
144 Id. at 37. 
145 Id. 
146 The Dastar Court reasoned:  “Assuming for the sake of argument that 
Dastar’s representation of itself as the ‘Producer’ of its videos amounted to a 
representation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing 
a cause of action under § 43(a) for that representation would create a species of 
mutant copyright law that limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use” ’ 
expired copyrights.” Id. at 34 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989)); see also id. at 34, 36–37 (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 
U.S. 225, 230 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121–22 
(1938); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)). 
147 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 30. 
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would-be right of integrity violation under reverse passing off 
false designation of origin.  Yet, Dastar’s holding that “the phrase 
‘origin of goods’ is . . . incapable of connoting the person or entity 
that originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody 
or contain”148 effectively eliminated the claim as a basis for relief 
concerning creative expressions and copyrighted works.  Most 
unfortunately, its application has not been limited to cases 
involving works in the public domain.149  Instead, courts have 
relied upon Dastar to deny false designation/right of attribution 
claims brought by various plaintiffs, in and outside of the music 
industry.150 
Consistent with the express instruction in § 2 and § 4 of the 
BCIA, the Dastar Court made no mention of Article 6bis and 
gave no apparent consideration to the need to preserve Lanham 
Act claims as an available domestic law path to enforcement of 
the right of attribution.151  But the Dastar Court had indeed 
considered and interpreted Congress’ intentional omission of 
moral rights for all but the subset of authors identified in VARA: 
When Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law 
of copyright, it has done so with much more specificity than the 
Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of “origin.”  The Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990, [ ] provides that the author of an artistic 
work “shall have the right . . . to claim authorship of that work.”  
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A). That express right of attribution is 
carefully limited and focused: It attaches only to specified 
“work[s] of visual art,” § 101, is personal to the artist, 
§§ 106A(b) and (e), and endures only for “the life of the author,” 
§ 106A(d)(1).  Recognizing in § 43(a) a cause of action for 
 
148 Id. at 32. 
149 Indeed, most of the cases citing Dastar involve Lanham Act claims in 
connection with third party uses of works that are still copyright protected. See, e.g., 
Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating Dastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly 
Revolutionized Copyright Preemption, 65 MD. L. REV. 206, 214–15 (2006) (discussing 
how lower courts have applied Dastar). 
150 See, e.g., Zyla v. Wadsworth, Div. of Thomson Corp., 360 F.3d 243, 252 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (applying Dastar to support preemption of Lanham Act claim regarding 
credit for a copyrighted textbook); Borrego v. BMG U.S. Latin, 92 F. App’x 572, 572 
(9th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment dismissing music composition author’s 
claim rising from mistaken attribution to another songwriter and holding that under 
Dastar, “Borrego no longer has a claim for ‘reverse passing off’ ”); Santa Rosa v. 
Combo Records, 376 F. Supp. 2d 148, 151–52 (D. P.R. 2005) (citing Dastar to dismiss 
false designation of origin claim based upon record company’s omission of salsa 
singer’s name from joint recordings); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. 
Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Carroll v. Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1357, 1361–62 
(N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
151 See, e.g., Dastar, 539 U.S. at 23. 
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misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted works 
(visual or otherwise) would render these limitations 
superfluous.  A statutory interpretation that renders another 
statute superfluous is of course to be avoided.152 
Thus, Dastar is read to support preemption of the Lanham Act 
§ 43(a) claim as a means of vindicating moral rights.  Though 
widely criticized for reaching beyond the scope of the issues 
presented in the case itself,153 Dastar remains the law of the land. 
Examining the legislative histories of the BCIA, VARA, and 
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (“TLRA”), Professor 
Mary LaFrance criticized Dastar two years after the opinion, 
rightly concluding that its narrow construction of § 43(a) is 
contrary to Congress’ express approval of Gilliam and Smith v. 
Montoro, as is reflected in the legislative history of the BCIA, 
without contradiction in that of the TLRA: 
The near-simultaneous consideration and enactment of these 
statutes makes the BCIA’s legislative history particularly 
helpful in interpreting the TLRA. Unfortunately, the Dastar 
opinion overlooks evidence in the BCIA’s history which strongly 
suggests that the 100th Congress not only acquiesced in the 
application of section 43(a) to false attributions of works of 
authorship, but expressly endorsed that application as an 
important component of the network of state and federal laws 
upon which Congress relied in concluding that the United 
States could comply with the moral rights provisions of the 
Berne Convention without enacting any new moral rights 
legislation.  In contrast to the legislative history of the TLRA, 
which is highly ambiguous in its treatment of reverse passing 
off claims in general, the legislative history of the BCIA strongly 
suggests that the 1988 Congress approved of applying section 
43(a) to reverse passing off of literary and artistic works. 
 
The Final Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence 
to the Berne Convention, issued in 1986, cited the then-current 
version of section 43(a) as a proxy for the moral rights of 
attribution and integrity. With respect to attribution, the 
Report unequivocally states that section 43(a) (as in effect at 
that time) “prohibits false designations of origins of works, 
including intellectual and artistic works, and prohibits false 
 
152 Id. at 34–35 (citations omitted). 
153 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 21, at 696–703 (proposing “a number of 
options . . . that could have avoided the uncertainties embedded in the opinion”); 
Bell, supra note 149, at 224 & n.114  (citing law review articles with critical 
commentary on Dastar); Rigamonti, supra note 73, at 409–10. 
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descriptions and representations of such works.”  Citing Smith 
v. Montoro and work of the late Professor Melville Nimmer, the 
Report notes “that omission of an author’s name from his work 
may constitute ‘an implied reverse passing off’ and thus violate 
section 43(a).”  When publication without attribution misleads 
the public into thinking that the publisher or producer of a 
work, rather than its author, was the originator of the work, the 
Report states, “[t]his is a false designation of origin under 
section 43(a).”  With respect to reverse passing off, the Report 
notes, in a section captioned “Prohibiting Identification of 
Another as Creator of the Author’s Work” that “[f]alse 
identification of another as author . . . may give rise to a claim 
by the actual author under section 43(a).”  In a section 
captioned “Prohibiting Identification of the Author as Creator of 
Another’s Work” - a reference to traditional passing off - the 
Report recognizes a series of federal cases as precedents 
supporting a remedy for “false identification” of expressive 
works under section 43(a).  Finally, with respect to the right of 
integrity, the Final Report cites Gilliam as a leading case, 
noting that “[c]ourts increasingly have granted authors 
protection for the integrity of their work under section 43(a).”154 
Despite the clear negative impact, Congress has done nothing to 
counter Dastar’s obliteration of false designation of origin claims 
as a viable legal theory for redress of would-be moral rights 
violations.  That is so, even in the face of the widespread judicial 
applications of the Supreme Court’s opinion that VARA signals 
legislative intent to preclude all authors from obtaining relief for 
violations of rights granted under VARA—that is the limited 
right of attribution and right of integrity—except for the limited 
subset of visual artists to which § 106A of the Copyright Act 
applies. 
2. False Endorsement Redress for Sound-Alikes, but not Actual 
Performances 
Various federal courts have found viable claims under 
Lanham Act § 43(a) for false endorsement based upon use of a 
celebrity’s name, image, or likeness to invoke their celebrity for 
commercial purposes, where such use was likely to confuse the 
consuming public about the celebrity’s association with or 
 
154 Mary LaFrance, When You Wish Upon Dastar: Creative Provenance and the 
Lanham Act, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 197, 222–24 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
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endorsement of the advertised goods or services.155  This theory of 
recovery has been extended to sound-alikes, under state law as 
well, establishing precedent that remains good law today.156 
But, bizarrely, claims for false endorsement have failed most 
music vocalists seeking to assert the theory for relief from use of 
their actual recorded performances.  The failures can be 
attributed to copyright preemption.157  There are, however, 
additional challenges to the viability of a false endorsement claim 
as an alternative to an express grant of moral rights.  One is the 
lack of a uniform test amongst federal circuits, which subjects 
plaintiffs to forum dependent outcomes and possibly emboldens 
defendants in venues with stricter tests.158  Another is the 
unpredictability of First Amendment defenses that may apply to 
the claim.159 
Recording artist Tom Waits prevailed on his claim for false 
endorsement—Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. in 1992—where Frito-Lay 
used a sound-alike to mimic Waits’ sound and style of singing a 
lyrically altered version of “Step Right Up,” a Waits song 
 
155 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 925–26 (6th Cir. 
2003); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003); Wendt v. Host 
Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 813–14 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing dismissal of Lanham Act 
claim for unfair competition and holding that the physical characteristics of robots 
could give rise to a claim for false endorsement due to the likelihood of confusion 
that the plaintiffs were endorsing the Cheers bars); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400–01 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding there was a genuine issue of 
material fact precluding summary judgment as to a false implied endorsement claim 
brought by Vanna White, the hostess of the “Wheel of Fortune” game show, for use 
in an advertisement for VCRs of a look-alike caricature robot endorsing the 
defendant’s product); Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 628–30 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (upholding actor Woody Allen’s claim of false implied endorsement for use in 
an advertisement for video-rental stores of a look-alike renting videos from 
defendant). 
156 See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a viable claim 
under California common law). 
157 See, e.g., Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 448 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (first citing Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2001); 
then citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 
(2003)). 
158 Id. at 448 (“Courts ‘have not established a uniform test for false endorsement 
under the Lanham Act.’ ” (quoting Barbara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect 
Tiger Woods? An Analysis of Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a 
Federal Right of Publicity, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1202, 1214 (2004))). 
159 Id. at 447–48 (“[C]ourts must construe the Lanham Act narrowly where 
necessary to avoid conflict with the First Amendment right to artistic expression.” 
(citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989))). 
492 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:453   
intended as “an indictment of advertising.”160  Waits took offense 
because the commercial not only caused confusion, but also 
conflicted with his long-standing and publicly asserted policy 
against commercially-purposed endorsements, based on “his 
philosophy that musical artists should not do commercials 
because it detracts from their artistic integrity.”161  Certainly this 
is the sort of ideological conflicting association that should be 
protected against. 
Nevertheless, myopically, most courts applying the Waits 
precedent have focused on the distinctiveness of Waits’ voice 
and/or whether the mimicked performance was close enough to 
the original artist’s performance to cause the confusion required 
for false endorsement.  In one such instance—Henley v. DeVore—
a California federal district court concluded that a state 
politician’s revision and performance of two Don Henley’s songs, 
including “All She Wants to Do Is Dance,” was not likely to make 
consumers believe Henley was singing the song.162  Dismissing 
Henley’s false endorsement claim on that basis, and disregarding 
survey evidence that forty-eight percent of consumers surveyed 
believed that Henley—as the composition copyright owner—had 
endorsed, authorized,  or approved the politician’s use of the 
songs, the court held that the relevant question under Waits was 
“whether people would reasonably think that Henley actually 
performed the music.”163  This outcome was an unfortunate 
disregard of the false approval basis for a Lanham Act § 43(a) 
claim, and it illustrates the inherent hit-or-miss nature of the 
alternative theory approach to meeting the United States’ moral 
rights obligations under the WPPT, as well as under the Berne 
Convention. 
One California federal district court did acknowledge that 
confusion as to endorsement could exist even in the absence of 
confusion as to source, when it refused to dismiss singer-
songwriter Jackson Browne’s claim against John McCain. 
McCain had used Browne’s 1977 hit “Running On Empty” in 
 
160 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 & n.1, 1111 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming judgment for 
plaintiff, Tom Waits, on false implied endorsement claim for use in a snack-food 
commercial of a singer who imitated plaintiff’s gravelly singing style praising 
defendant’s product), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
161 Id. at 1097. 
162 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Waits, 978 F.2d at 
1111). 
163 Id. at 1168–69 (emphasis in original). 
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McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign web-video commercial to 
criticize then Democratic Presidential candidate Barak Obama’s 
energy policy.164  Plainly stating that the problem was an 
ideology conflict, rather than an issue of money, Browne had 
complained that he had “received numerous inquiries expressing 
concern about Defendants’ use of the composition and Browne’s 
performance,” and that “ ‘nothing could be further from the 
truth’ ” than the commercial’s false suggestion that he sponsored, 
endorsed, or was associated with McCain or the Republican 
Party.165 
But most courts have declined to extend the protection 
afforded to Waits under Lanham Act § 43(a) from use of a sound-
alike singing a signature song, to music vocalists asserting the 
same false endorsement claim based upon use of their actual 
recorded performances.166 
When Frito-Lay struck again, this time using singer Atrud 
Gilberto’s 1964167 recorded performance of her world-famous 
signature song, “The Girl from Ipanema,” as the soundtrack for a 
thirty-second commercial introducing Frito-Lay’s baked potato 
chips in 1996, the Second Circuit—in its 2001 Oliveira v. Frito-
Lay, Inc. decision—summarily affirmed dismissal of Gilberto’s 
false endorsement claim, holding simply that “use of her recorded 
song ha[d] not taken her persona,” so “a factfinder could not 
reasonably find an implied endorsement.”168 
Following Oliveira, courts have held that a false 
endorsement claim cannot be sustained purely on the basis of the 
use of an artist’s song(s) and that use of a single signature song is 
not enough.169  The apparent assumption is that consumers will 
 
164 Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1128, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
Defendant raised fair use as a defense, but the court declined to adjudicate the issue 
on a motion to dismiss, as it was a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 1130. The 
court similarly rejected the defendant’s First Amendment artistic relevance defense, 
due to its limited inquiry on the motion. Id. at 1132–33. The case settled prior to 
adjudication on the merits. See Johnston, supra note 10, at 690. 
165 Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (quoting Complaint at 1, Browne v. McCain, 
612 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08-05334), 2008 WL 3849451). 
166 Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 58, 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2001); Henley, 733 
F. Supp. 2d at 1168; see also Arlen W. Langvardt, Musicians, Politicians and the 
Forgotten Tort, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 476–78 (2017). 
167 The pre-1972 sound recording of “The Girl from Ipanema” was subject to 
state copyright law. See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 64 n.2. 
168 Id. at 58, 60, 62, 64. 
169 See Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (holding “a single signature song, considered alone, cannot form the basis of a 
false endorsement claim”; but finding sufficient evidence to support jury verdict of 
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not be confused about endorsement if they hear the original 
sound recording.170  Such an assumption implies that courts are 
relying on consumers to know and understand that copyright 
licensing practices enable use of sound recordings without the 
music vocalist’s consent, and therefore the use does not support a 
reasonable inference of endorsement. 
Based on that judicial assumption, were Frito-Lay to make 
another commercial using Waits’ actual recorded performance in 
“Step Right Up” instead of a sound-alike, Waits would lose on his 
claim.  That result is absurd in the context of providing redress 
for the ideological conflict that arises from associating Waits with 
any commercial advertising at all, given his stance on artistic 
integrity and commercials.  But it perfectly illustrates the 
problem with attempting to address moral rights and personhood 
violations by using alternative theories that do not take the 
personal interests of artists into consideration, let alone 
prioritize those interests. 
3. Rejection of the “Signature Song” Basis for Trademark 
Infringement 
Courts have acknowledged that songs can function as a 
trademark to signal the source of a good or service.171  Such song 
marks include not only advertising jingles specifically written for 
a commercial campaign, but also preexisting songs that become 
associated with a single product or service source through use 
over time.172  Yet, even while acknowledging that a signature 
song—meaning one that a “widespread audience associates with 
 
false endorsement based on use of multiple Beastie Boys songs for eighty percent of 
the commercial, in conjunction with use of the group’s name); Henley, 733 F. Supp. 
2d at 1168 (“Plaintiffs cannot maintain a Lanham Act claim based purely on the use 
of Henley’s songs.”). For a hybrid-basis, where allegations that the defendants used 
both copyrighted recordings and sound-alikes for a social media celebrity’s 
endorsement of singer Beyoncé’s single “Formation” and the related tour, see Estate 
of Barre v. Carter, No. 17-1057, slip op. at 2 (E.D. La. July 25, 2017). 
170 See Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 (“Where an advertisement mimics a 
celebrity’s voice to endorse a product, a customer may be understandably confused 
as to whether the celebrity is actually endorsing the product. However the mere use 
of the celebrity’s prior performance does not present the same sort of confusion.”). 
171 See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 61 (“For many decades it has been commonplace for 
merchandising companies to adopt songs, tunes and ditties as marks for their goods 
or services, played in commercials on the radio or television.”). 
172 A ready example of a preexisting song being used as a trademark is “Like a 
Rock,” written and sung by Bob Seger, which became associated with Chevy trucks 
through Chevrolet’s repeated use of the songs in its truck commercials from 1991 to 
2004. See Beastie Boys, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 453. 
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the performing artist”173—can indeed come to signify a single 
source instead of just the song itself, courts have consistently 
rejected claimed trademark rights in songs as a source identifier 
for the entertainment services of the music vocalist who 
popularized the song in the first place.174 
The justification for refusing to recognize song marks for 
services of vocalists, as was articulated by the Second Circuit in 
Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., has little to do with trademark law 
and everything to do with preserving copyright law as the means 
for controlling economic exploitation of music compositions and 
sound recordings: 
We cannot say it would be unthinkable for the trademark law to 
accord to a performing artist a trademark or service mark in her 
signature performance . . . .  But for a court now to “recognize” 
the previously unknown existence of such a right would be 
profoundly disruptive to commerce.  Numerous artists who 
could assert claims similar to Gilberto’s would bring suit 
against entities that had paid bona fide license fees to all known 
holders of rights. Indeed, artists who had licensed users under 
their copyrights and had received fees for the copyright license 
could bring suits claiming additional compensation for 
infringement of trademark rights.  Immense unforeseen 
liabilities might accrue, upsetting reasonable commercial 
expectations.  We can see no justification for now altering the 
commercial world’s understanding of the scope of trademark 
rights in this fashion.175 
And so, Gilberto was left without any recourse because Frito-Lay 
had paid $200,000 for license to use the master.176 
 
173 The Second Circuit defined a “ ‘signature performance’ ” as one “that a 
widespread audience associates with the performing artist,” and acknowledged that 
“[m]any famous artists have recorded such signature performances that their 
audiences identify with the performer.” Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62. 
174 See id. at 62 (citing Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 
712–13 (9th Cir.1970) (where court rejected a “claim by singer Nancy Sinatra that 
song she sang ‘has been so popularized by [Sinatra] that her name is identified with 
it; that she is best known by her connection with the song [and] that said 
song . . . has acquired a secondary meaning’ such that another person could not sing 
it in a commercial”)); cf. Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1054 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004) (“Rebirth of Slick (Cool Like Dat)” “has become the ‘signature song’ for 
Digitable Planets, closely associated with the group and the members of the group.”). 
See also Beastie Boys, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 453 (“[A]n artist’s ‘signature performance’ 
cannot establish a trademark signifying that artist.”). 
175 Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62–63. 
176 Id. at 58. 
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The Oliveira court’s rationale echoed the Ninth Circuit’s 
concern some thirty years prior to the Oliveira case, when, at a 
time prior to federal copyright protection for sound recordings, 
the court denied all relief to recording artist Nancy Sinatra, of 
“These Boots Were Made for Walking” fame, on a claim for 
passing off under California unfair competition law against the 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, seeking injunctive relief and 
damages for essentially the same scenario for which Waits 
successfully sued Frito-Lay twenty years later. 177  Sinatra 
claimed that the song had acquired secondary meaning, and 
alleged that Goodyear had intentionally passed off the services of 
others as the service of Sinatra. 178  Without holding that there 
was no secondary meaning, the Ninth Circuit reasoned as 
follows: 
Here, the defendants had paid a very substantial sum to the 
copyright proprietor to obtain the license for the use of the song 
and all of its arrangements.  The plaintiff had not sought or 
obtained the same rights which would have protected the 
secondary meaning she asserts . . . .  [T]he inherent difficulty of 
protecting or policing a “performance” or the creation of a 
performer in handling copyrighted material licensed to another 
imposes problems of supervision that are almost impossible for 
a court of equity.  
An added clash with the copyright laws is the potential 
restriction which recognition of performers’ “secondary 
meanings” places upon the potential market of the copyright 
proprietor.  If a proposed licensee must pay each artist who has 
played or sung on the composition and who might therefore 
claim unfair competition-performer’s protection, the licensee 
may well be discouraged to the point of complete loss of interest.  
Finally, . . . to allow unfair competition protection where 
Congress has not given federal protection is in effect granting 
state copyright benefits without the federal limitations of time 
to permit definite public domain use.179 
 
 
177 See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 717–18 (affirming summary judgment). Goodyear 
had modified the lyrics and used the music to Sinatra’s signature song “These Boots 
Were Made for Walking” for a widespread radio and television advertising campaign 
for its new “wide boot” tires, and resorted to hiring singers to imitate Sinatra’s voice, 
performance style, and mannerisms when it could not hire Sinatra for the 
commercials. Id. at 712–13. 
178 Id. at 712. 
179 Id. at 717–18 (footnote and citation omitted). 
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Thus, we can add to the historic concern about copyright conflict 
or preemption, judicial concerns about overextending unfair 
competition law in a way that undercuts predictability of the 
familiar copyright licensing scheme and a concern about how to 
manage, enforce, or police performer rights if some are 
recognized.180 
B. Tort Theory: Right of Publicity and Misappropriation of 
Voice Claims 
The distinction in the false endorsement context between use 
of sound-alikes, which are held to implicate persona, and use of 
actual voice via recordings, which are held not to do so, has 
carried over to claims sounding in tort.181  As a result, courts 
have held that right of publicity and misappropriation of voice 
claims are preempted by copyright law, rendering them 
ineffective as an alternative means of providing redress for 
violation of a music vocalist’s personhood rights.182 
Such was the case when recording artist Debra Laws 
asserted a common law misappropriation of voice claim and a 
California statutory right of publicity claim against Sony Music 
Entertainment for using samples of her recorded performance 
from her signature hit, “Very Special,” throughout the song “All I 
Have” by Jennifer Lopez and L.L. Cool J, without her 
permission.183  Laws had recorded “Very Special” in 1981, while 
under contract with Elektra, which owned the copyright in the 
master.184  Sony had licensed the samples from Elektra.  The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of both claims, holding that 
“federal copyright law preempts a claim alleging 
misappropriation of one’s voice, when the entirety of the 
allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is contained within 
a copyrighted medium.”185  The court further held that “the right 
 
180 See id.; see also Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62–63. 
181 Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
182 See, e.g., id. at 1056–57 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (dismissing right of publicity claim 
based on Target’s use of the group Digable Planets’ recorded performance of their 
signature song “Cool Like Dat” in Target commercial campaign as preempted). 
183 See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. (Laws II), 448 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (9th 
Cir. 2006); Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. (Laws I), 294 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1161 
(C.D. Cal. 2003). 
184 See Laws II, 448 F.3d at 1136; see also Laws I, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 1161. 
185 Laws II, 448 F.3d at 1141 (“Sony was not imitating ‘Very Special’ as Laws 
might have sung it.  Rather, it used a portion of ‘Very Special’ as sung by Debra 
Laws.”). 
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of publicity is not a license to limit the copyright holder’s rights 
merely because one disagrees with decisions to license the 
copyright,” and reiterated its earlier reasoning in Sinatra 
regarding concerns about subjecting copyright licensees to suit by 
performers.186 
In other instances where music vocalists sought relief from 
objectionable uses of their recorded performances via right of 
publicity or misappropriation of voice theories, their claims have 
been hampered by language in a New York statute that expressly 
excludes liability for use of name, likeness, or voice of artists in 
connection with their musical productions that have been sold or 
disposed of.187  On this basis, rape survivor Connie Francis was 
deprived of relief from Universal’s use of her signature hits in its 
film, notwithstanding her personal objections to the violent and 
sexual nature of the film.188  Francis’ claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress was also dismissed, but on the 
ground that Universal “did not act extremely or outrageously, 
but in conformity with its contract,”189 illustrating, again, judicial 
priority for the licensee’s contractual rights to the detriment of 
artist personhood rights. 
The effect of the exception language in the New York right of 
publicity statute is antithetical to the mandated moral right 
under the WPPT, which is supposed to ensure that the artist 
retains control and protection of personhood rights even after 
sale of the economic right(s).190 
C. Compromised Reliability of Contract Theory 
Ideally, the ability to negotiate limitations on the use and 
exploitation of a copyrightable work should encompass an ability 
 
186 Id. at 1145 (citing Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 718 
(1970) and opining that “[i]t is hard to imagine how a copyright would remain 
meaningful if its licensees were potentially subject to suit from any performer 
anytime the copyrighted material was used”). 
187 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS Law § 51 (McKinney 2018) provides:  
But nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any 
person, firm or corporation . . . from using the name, portrait, picture or 
voice of any author composer, or artists in connection with his literary, 
musical or artistic productions which he has so or disposed of with such 
name, portrait, picture or voice used in connection therewith. 
188 Franconero v. Universal Music Corp., No. 02 Civ. 1963, 2003 WL 22990060, 
at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003). 
189 Id. at *3 (holding that “[w]here the defendant had a proper business motive 
for its actions, intentional infliction claims will not lie”). 
190 WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 5. 
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to protect moral rights of the author of the work.191  However, 
contract theory as a stand-in for express provision of moral rights 
is compromised on two levels. 
First, the use of contracts in this manner relies upon the 
author having sufficient bargaining power to successfully 
negotiate such limits on the use and exploitation of the work.  
However, most music vocalists simply do not have the requisite 
leverage to extract such limits when entering into recording 
contracts that transfer copyright ownership and related 
exploitation rights for the artist’s sound recordings to the record 
labels.192 
Second, even where authors are able to negotiate for 
limitations on the exploitation of transferred works, contract 
theory is unreliable.  Referring back to Gilliam, the plaintiffs’ 
copyright infringement claim was based on ABC’s production and 
broadcasting of an unauthorized derivative work.193  Although 
ABC had permissibly licensed use of the recordings for broadcast 
from BBC, the court held that ABC was nonetheless liable for 
infringement because any license from BBC to edit the 
recordings had exceeded the scope of the license between the 
scriptwriters and BBC, making the sub-license from BBC void.194  
Thus, contract theory helped to enforce the negotiated bounds of 
BBC’s copyright in the recordings and did not shield licensees 
from liability.  But for Debra Laws, the Ninth Circuit held that to 
the extent that Laws had enforceable, contractual limitations on 
Elektra’s use of its copyright in her sound recordings, that is 
requiring her permission for licensing “Very Special,” her remedy 
was against Elektra for breach of contract and not against Sony 
as Elektra’s licensee.195 
 
191 See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1392 n.10 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[U]nder 
copyright law, while a licensor has no ‘moral right’ to control the quality of licensed 
depictions, she may insist, contractually, on approval provisions to ‘assure quality 
control and high standards in the exploitation’ of her creative work.”). 
192 See Chisolm, supra note 2, at 291, 300, 305, 307, 311. 
193 Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1976). 
194 Id. at 20–21. 
195 Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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V. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FILL THE GAP IN PROTECTIONS 
AGAINST HARMS TO PERSONHOOD INTERESTS OF MUSIC 
VOCALISTS 
In a prior article, this author proposed an amendment to 
§ 102 of the Copyright Act to add a licensable, but otherwise 
inalienable copyright for music vocalists in their music 
performance as an “applied music composition,” and an 
amendment to § 106 to limit the derivative use of sound 
recordings in accordance with the scope of the music performance 
copyright.196  The prior article focused on the proposed 
amendments as a solution to primarily economic inequities, and 
it explained why copyright law must be the vehicle to address 
those inequities.197  This Part demonstrates how the proposed 
amendments could fill the gap in protections against harms to 
personhood, without unreasonably hindering the economic rights 
of non-performer sound recording copyright owners.  It also 
demonstrates how the proposed amendments would enhance the 
United States’ compliance with its obligations under the WPPT 
to provide coexistent, mutually exclusive rights to reproduce, 
distribute, publicly perform, and commercially rent the 
performers’ fixed performances and the sound recording 
copyright owners’ sound recordings. 
Adopting the proposed amendments would eliminate the 
copyright conflict and copyright preemption concerns presented 
by attempted use of noncopyright law claims fill the gap of 
missing moral rights in our copyright regime. 
A. Scope of Proposed Copyright in “Applied Music Composition” 
This author proposes to recognize the music vocalist’s 
auditory performance as a discrete, copyrightable work—the 
applied music composition—under § 102(a), whenever the 
performance satisfies the threshold requirement for original 
creative contribution.198  Upon fixation of the performance, a 
copyright in the applied music composition would vest in the 
music vocalist, just as the initial fixing of a composition vests the 
 
196 As mentioned in Part I, the amendments that are further discussed here 
were first proposed in a related article which focused primarily on addressing 
economic inequities for music vocalists. Chisolm, supra note 2, at 330–33. 
197 See generally id. at 320–28. 
198 Id. at 330 (noting that “[t]he existing body of case law provides the necessary 
benchmark for determining whether the minimum threshold for original creativity is 
satisfied”). 
2018] IN LIEU OF MORAL RIGHTS 501 
composition copyright in the songwriter/composer.  Similarly, 
“allowable forms of fixation for the applied music composition 
would be . . . either notated copy, or non-audio digital files, or a 
phonorecord, ״ and acceptable deposit copies “would be any of 
these three for registration as a work of performing arts, or a 
phonorecord for simultaneous registration, where ownership of 
the sound recording and applied composition are the same.”199  
Further, repeating here what was originally proposed, 
The copyright bundle for the applied composition should include 
all rights available under Section 106, which are the rights: 
(i) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies and 
phonorecords; (ii) to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work; (iii) to distribute copies or phonorecords of 
the copyrighted work to the public by sale to other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (iv) to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by any means (whether live or by 
playing or broadcast of recorded or live performances, as well as 
by digital transmission); and (v) to display the work 
publicly. . . .  
Once fixed, the applied composition would be protected beyond 
any sound recording encompassing the audio performance, 
subject to a compulsory mechanical license, just as compositions 
are treated.  The compulsory license would allow any other 
person to lawfully make and distribute copies/phonorecords of 
the resulting musical structure embodied by the applied 
composition, if that person’s primary objective is distribution to 
the public for private use.  Modified statutory royalties would 
apply to enable compensation for composers and vocalists where 
applicable.  In the instance where the composer is the 
performer, the modified royalty would collapse to the original 
composer royalty scheme.200 
Allowing the proposed applied music composition copyright 
to coexist with, but otherwise be separate from, the copyright in 
the sound recording provides a means of compliance with WPPT 
Article 8(1), which requires that “[p]erformers shall enjoy the 
exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public 
of the original and copies of their performances fixed in 
phonograms through sale or other transfer of ownership,” as well 
as with WPPT Articles 9 and 10, which require that performers  
 
 
199 Id. at 331. 
200 Id. The further discussion of a sample statutory royalty split explained in the 
prior article is omitted here. 
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“enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the commercial 
rental . . . . and the making available to the public” of their fixed 
performances.201 
Moreover, including the derivative work’s exclusive right as 
part of the copyright bundle for this new right is imperative, 
because it is that part of the bundle that enables the performer to 
assert and protect the right of integrity contemplated by WPPT 
Article 5(1).  “U.S. authors who hold the derivate right may 
prevent modifications to their work that run [counter] to 
their . . . sensibilities, without any need to show consumer 
deception or harm to reputation[,]” 202 as would be required on a 
Lanham Act or defamation claim, respectively. 
B. Duration of Proposed “Applied Music Composition” Copyright 
The duration of the applied music composition copyright 
should match the duration of all other individually held 
copyrights under the copyright law.  Such a duration is 
consistent with Article 5(2) of WIPO’s WPPT, which requires that 
“[t]he rights granted to a performer in accordance with [Article 
5,] paragraph (1) shall, after his death, be maintained, at least 
until the expiry of the economic rights.”203 
C. Restriction on Right to Make Derivative Works of Sound 
Recordings 
This author also proposes a restriction on the right to make 
derivative works from sound recordings in two respects. 
First, derivative works from sound recordings would require 
using the integrated whole, and not allow vocals to be isolated 
from the sound recording for separate use.  The purpose of this 
restriction is: 
[T]o curtail the ability of the record label and non-feature-
vocalist joint authors of the sound recording (i.e. producers, 
sound engineers, back-up vocalists, etc.) to create or license 
others to create derivative works of the sound recording that 
make use of the vocalist’s audio performance isolated from the 
contributions of the back-up vocalists, musicians, and/or sound 
engineer.204   
 
201 WPPT, supra note 90, at arts. 8(1), 9(1). 
202 Netanel, supra note 54, at 43 (“The derivative right . . . is essentially 
coterminous with at least the negative aspect of the integrity right.”). 
203 WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 5(2).  
204 Chisolm, supra note 2, at 332.  
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Parties desiring to use the featured vocalist’s isolated 
recorded performance would have to seek permission from the 
vocalist, as owner of the applied music composition copyright, 
instead of from the record label, as owner of the sound recording 
copyright.  This restriction is consistent with the objective of joint 
work authorship because joint authors must intend for their 
contributions to “be merged into inseparable [and] 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”205 
Second, the sound recording copyright owner’s right to make 
or license derivative works from the sound recording would be 
subject to consent from the vocalist, as owner of the applied 
composition copyright.  This proposed “restriction recognizes the 
applied composition as a musical work and not merely a recorded 
performance.  It also affords the music vocalist more control over 
the content (political, artistic, or otherwise) with which the sound 
recording may be associated by later licensing and use.”206  
The notion of requiring multiple permissions for exploitation 
of a work is already ingrained in the United States copyright 
regime.  Use of sound recordings has always required permission 
from the owner of the underlying composition copyright.  The 
requirement of one more permission should pose no obstacle to 
exploitation of sound recording, especially when the music 
vocalist(s) holding the right would be easily identifiable and 
likely as easy to locate for purposes of effecting the transaction.  
A marginal increase in exploitation transaction costs to account 
for directing passive income to the music vocalist is justified, 
where third party interest in using the work stems from the 
applied music composition rather than just the bare music 
composition.  Such an increase would likely still represent a 
savings over the cost of the third party having to arrange for and 
record a new performance of the bare music composition for the 
third party’s intended use.  
 
205 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work”). 
206 Chisolm, supra note 2, at 332–33. 
504 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:453   
D. Inalienability vs Alienability of the “Applied Music 
Composition” Copyright 
1. The Rationale for Inalienability, Subject to 
Contemporaneous License 
Consistent with a true monist perspective on copyrights, the 
applied music composition would include personhood protections 
“rolled into” the economic rights elements of the copyright.  And 
as the German Copyright Act has demonstrated is possible, the 
economic interest elements of the applied music composition 
copyright should be licensable, but otherwise the copyright 
should be inalienable for a number of reasons.  Moreover, the 
license should be contemporaneous with the requested use, 
rather than a blanket advance license. 
First, making the new right completely alienable or subject 
to advance licensing would subject its worth to “the same 
bargaining power imbalances and result in the same inequities” 
that music vocalists currently experience regarding ownership of 
the sound recording copyright, and thus accomplish nothing 
meaningful.207  Second, and conversely, “[m]aking the new right 
inalienable would eliminate ownership claims under the work-
for-hire doctrine, since, by definition, the applied composition 
copyright could only vest in the vocalist.”208  Third, the concept of 
inalienability is critical to the personhood paradigm for 
copyright. 
According to Professor Justin Hughes, “[n]ot only does 
Hegel’s personality [justification] theory pose no inherent 
objection to this kind of alienation of intellectual property, it also 
provides affirmative justifications,” including the economic well-
being of the author; payments for use of the work equate to 
recognition of the author’s control of the work and the generation 
of “income facilitates further expression.”209  Notably, in arguing 
that personhood “theory provides a better, more direct 
justification for the alienation of intellectual property, especially 
copies,” which enable dissemination of the author’s expression, 
Professor Hughes identifies the creator’s receipt of public 
 
207 See id. at 330 (arguing that “[t]he new right should be inalienable . . . for the 
same reasons the termination rights under §§ 203 and 304 [of the Copyright Act] are 
inalienable,” i.e. to avoid “the same inequities that result when an artist does not 
know ‘the true monetary value of their works prior to commercial exploitation’ ”). 
208 Id. 
209 Hughes, supra note 21, at 349. 
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identification—that is the moral right of attribution—and 
protection of the work “against any changes unintended or 
unapproved by the creator”—the moral right of integrity—as 
essential conditions to the justification of alienation.210 
In sum, while the strictest interpretation of inalienability 
requires an absolute prohibition against any separation of rights 
from the author, prohibiting waiver and assignment while 
allowing licenses is consistent with even the strict monist 
perspective illustrated by German copyright law.  It is apparent 
from the express language of the WPPT that alienability of 
economic rights, with inalienability of moral rights is indeed 
contemplated, so the proposed inalienability of the applied 
composition copyright provides the “means of redress for 
safeguarding” the moral rights mandated by Article 5(1), without 
having to expressly grant moral rights.211 
2. The Effects on Sound Recording Copyrights 
The U.S. copyright regime expressly embraces unlimited 
alienability of each exclusive right in the copyright bundle 
enumerated in § 106 of the Copyright Act. 212  “The principle of 
unlimited alienability requires that an author be free to assign, 
license, and waive each of these exploitation rights.”213  Some 
might even argue that alienability furthers the utilitarian goal of 
ensuring dissemination of copyrightable works.  As Netanel 
explained, 
Under the utilitarian model, the widespread dissemination of 
intellectual works is as important a goal of copyright as is their 
creation. Since dissemination is accomplished by publishers and 
distributors, rather than authors, copyright is designed as much 
to protect the publisher’s investment in bringing a work to 
market as it is to give the author an incentive to produce.  Thus,  
 
 
 
 
210 Id. at 350. 
211 United States Convention World Intellectual Property Organization 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 5(3), May 20, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17. 
212 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of 
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize” the 
enumerated rights described) (emphasis added); id. § 204 (providing for transfers to 
copyright ownership by operation of law or by written instrument signed by the 
rightsholder or an authorized agent). 
213 Netanel, supra note 54, at 1. 
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since the Statute of Anne of 1710, the English predecessor to 
U.S. copyright law, statutory copyright privileges have been 
accorded to authors’ assigns as well as to authors themselves.214 
However, in a framework such as the music industry, when the 
investments advanced by record labels for production, marketing, 
and distribution of the copyrighted sound recordings are one-
hundred percent recoupable from the recording artist,215 the 
rationale for favoring absolute alienability and subordination of 
the recording artist’s personhood rights and reward is not 
compelling. 
It is precisely because a recording artist does not receive 
passive income—royalties—until reaching recouped status that 
the economic incentive for the artist, as author of the applied 
music composition, to encourage, authorize, and enable 
distribution and exploitation of the sound recordings embodying 
the applied music composition would be as strong as that of the 
recording label holding the copyright in the sound recording.  The 
artist and the label both benefit from recouping the costs of 
masters production and promotion via record sales and 
derivative use.  In that way, the economic interests of the 
recording artist and the record label are the same and, 
presumably, those interests diverge only where the personhood 
interests of the recording artist are in conflict.  Thus, it would be 
in the best interest of the artist to minimize withholding 
authorization for derivative works in the absence of serious 
compromises to the artist’s personhood interests.  Recording 
contracts could be read to impose a covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing with respect to artists’ contemporaneous consent to 
exploitation of the masters.  Copyright misuse would serve as an 
additional check against unwarranted interference with the 
label’s ability to recoup its investments. 
Accordingly, making the applied music composition 
copyright an inalienable right belonging solely to the featured 
music vocalist(s), subject only to licensing of the economic rights 
of exploitation, would not hinder economic exploitation as the 
courts have speculated.  To the contrary, the inalienability of the 
moral rights elements would ensure the alienability of the 
economic rights elements by serving as the prophylactic measure 
against harmful exploitation. 
 
214 Id. at 11. 
215 See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 74–82. 
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Finally, the proposed amendments are consistent with what 
the Committee on Foreign Relations contemplated: parallel 
rights that “may be exercised separately by the performers and 
producers” such that “[p]ermission from both the performer and 
the producer must be obtained for a third-party” to exploit the 
phonogram,216 subject to legislated domestic limitations, such as 
fair use, and other restrictions.217 
CONCLUSION 
Compliance with WPPT requires the United States to enact 
laws that vindicate music performers’ moral rights of attribution 
and integrity, as this Article has demonstrated that continued 
reliance on existing domestic laws is simply unfounded.  Actual 
compliance with WPPT and Article 6 of the Berne Convention is 
a true necessity as continued technological progress and 
globalization combine to all but eliminate meaning and effect of 
territorial bounds for creation and exploitation of intellectual 
property. 
In demonstrating the inefficacy of contract, tort, and unfair 
competition law as substitutes for an explicit grant of the moral 
right of integrity or other protections for personhood rights, Part 
IV identified recurring themes of copyright conflict or 
preemption, resistance to changing predictability of ingrained 
industry licensing practices, and perceived challenges to 
managing, enforcing, and policing additional performer rights, if 
some are recognized.  The proposed new rights and restrictions 
directly address these concerns. 
While the United States may never incorporate an express 
provision of the mandated moral rights of attribution and 
integrity for all authors of creative works into U.S. copyright law, 
or any other statutory law, this Article has shown that such 
codification is unnecessary, with respect to music vocalists, if the 
proposed amendments are adopted. 
 
 
216 See WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept., supra note 111, at 9. 
217 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (providing various limitations on 
exclusive rights); United States Convention World Intellectual Property 
Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 16, May 20, 2002, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 105-17. 
